



# Legislative Bicameralism and Governance Outcomes: An Empirical Analysis of Institutional Configurations

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## 1. Introduction

The quality of governance is closely linked to the structure and functioning of political institutions. Institutional arrangements establish the formal rules for political processes and shape the incentives and constraints faced by political actors, thereby influencing the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of state institutions. This study examines the relationship between institutional structures and governance outcomes, focusing on how constitutional design, political alignment, and electoral systems affect institutional quality across countries. It specifically considers features such as the form of government, the presence and design of bicameral legislatures, party alignment across legislative chambers, and methods of upper house elections. The empirical investigation assesses how these characteristics influence key governance indicators, including control of corruption, government effectiveness, voice and accountability, judicial independence, and government social expenditure.

The motivation for this research is grounded in both comparative political theory and the historical experience of Bangladesh. The fall of the previous political regime revealed widespread public demand for accountability and participatory governance. Citizens mobilised against non-democratic practices, demanding structural reforms to prevent the concentration of executive power and to restore democratic balance. The interim government that assumed authority after the transition has undertaken various reform initiatives with a view to ensure neutrality, accountability, and fairness. Its efforts focused on strengthening legislative oversight, ensuring free and competitive elections, and rebuilding trust in the parliamentary system. In this context, proposals for structural reforms, including the establishment of bicameral legislature, were put forward by the Consensus Commission and other reform commissions. These reforms were intended to improve legislative scrutiny, diffuse excessive concentration of power, and institutionalise accountability mechanisms for the ruling party.

The case of Bangladesh illustrates a broader theoretical and practical question: whether reforms within an existing unicameral parliament, such as strengthening parliamentary committees or reducing the dominance of the majority party, are sufficient to enhance governance quality, or whether a bicameral structure is necessary to provide effective checks and balances. This study situates its empirical investigation within a comparative framework whilst explicitly connecting it to the Bangladeshi context. Using cross-country panel data, it operationalises institutional, political, and governance variables to assess how structural features, including bicameralism, electoral design, and party alignment, influence governance performance. The research aims to provide evidence-based insights on the potential effectiveness of parliamentary reforms in promoting transparency, accountability, and adherence to the rule of law both in Bangladesh and in other countries with similar institutional challenges.

## **2. Research Question and Study Objectives**

Which type of Parliamentary system ensures better transparency, accountability and efficiency of the ruling party, better in ensuring social welfare, voice of the people, better public relations, independence of judiciary?

## **3. Literature Review**

The study of political institutions and their impact on governance outcomes have been a long-standing theme in political science, political economy, and comparative politics. Institutions are not merely formal structures for political processes; they shape the incentives of political actors, determine the distribution of power, and affect the quality of governance (North 1990; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). By structuring decision-making and shaping political competition, institutional design influences both state capacity and accountability.

### **Constitutional Arrangements and the Form of Government**

A central debate in the comparative politics literature concerns the relative merits of presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential systems. Shugart and Carey (1992) emphasise that presidentialism, by concentrating executive authority in a directly elected president, can generate executive–legislative deadlock and foster authoritarian tendencies. Cheibub (2007) further shows that presidential systems are more prone to democratic breakdown, largely due to their rigid separation of powers and limited flexibility in executive removal. In contrast, parliamentary systems, where the executive is accountable to the legislature, are associated with greater executive–legislative cooperation and stronger responsiveness to voters (Lijphart, 1999). Empirical studies suggest that parliamentary regimes achieve superior governance outcomes, including higher government effectiveness, more robust accountability, and stronger rule of law (Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Gerring et al., 2009).

However, the advantages of parliamentary systems are not uncontested. Some scholars argue that presidentialism can provide greater accountability by allowing voters to directly choose their executives (Shugart and Carey, 1992). Others suggest that hybrid systems may combine the strengths of both institutional models but can also create new tensions and dual legitimacy conflicts (Elgie, 2011). The implications of regime type for governance therefore remain an open empirical question, particularly when considering variations in electoral design and legislative structure.

### **Bicameralism and Legislative Oversight**

The presence of bicameral legislature is often justified as a mechanism to enhance checks and balances, prevent the concentration of power, and represent territorial or functional diversity (Lijphart, 1999; Tsebelis and Money, 1997). Theoretically, bicameralism can strengthen accountability by requiring broader consensus and by giving a second chamber the ability to review and constrain legislation. In practice, however, the effectiveness of bicameralism depends on the independence and composition of the upper house. If the upper chamber is dominated by the same political party or coalition as the lower house, oversight may weaken, and accountability may be reduced (Patterson and Mughan, 2001).

Empirical evidence presents a mixed picture. Stapenhurst and Pelizzo (2006) find that bicameralism can reduce corruption when upper chambers are elected independently and represent diverse interests. Yet other studies indicate that bicameralism often leads to legislative inefficiency, duplication, and stalemate, especially when party polarisation is high (Russell, 2000). The impact of bicameralism on governance therefore appears contingent on institutional context, party alignment, and electoral rules.

### **Electoral Systems and Representation**

Electoral design is a foundational determinant of political accountability and inclusiveness. Proportional representation (PR) systems are associated with multi-party competition, coalition governments, and a higher degree of inclusiveness in policymaking (Lijphart, 1999). PR systems also tend to foster higher levels of social spending and redistribution because broad-based coalitions respond to a larger share of voter preferences (Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Persson and Tabellini, 2005). In contrast, plurality or majoritarian systems often concentrate power in a single party, privileging efficiency but reducing representativeness (Powell, 2000).

The type of electoral system also has implications for corruption and accountability. Chang and Golden (2007) find that PR systems may reduce corruption by encouraging intra-party competition and diluting the influence of single dominant actors. Others argue that PR systems may create collective action problems within governing coalitions, leading to clientelism and inefficiencies (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman, 2005). Thus, whilst PR systems generally promote inclusiveness, their relationship with governance outcomes is complex and context dependent.

### **Political Alignment and Polarisation**

The degree of alignment between the executive and legislative chambers significantly affects the strength of institutional checks. When the same party controls both houses, the incentives for oversight decline, potentially reducing accountability and increasing opportunities for corruption (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). O'Donnell (1998) describes this as a form of 'delegative democracy', where elected leaders face weak institutional constraints and operate with broad discretion. Conversely, divided government, where different parties control different branches, can strengthen oversight but may also generate policy gridlock.

Political polarisation further complicates this dynamic. Whilst moderate levels of polarisation can enhance accountability by clarifying policy alternatives, extreme polarisation may undermine governance effectiveness and reduce institutional cooperation (McCarty et al., 2006). Thus, alignment and polarisation interact with constitutional and electoral design to shape governance outcomes.

### **Judicial Independence and Rule of Law**

Judicial independence is a cornerstone of governance quality. Courts that are insulated from political interference are better able to uphold constitutional constraints, ensure rules of law, and check executive authority (La Porta et al., 2004). Ferejohn and Rosenbluth (2009) argue that parliamentary systems are more conducive to judicial independence, as executives are indirectly chosen and have fewer incentives to politicize the judiciary. Ríos-Figueroa and Staton (2014) emphasise that judicial autonomy depends not only on formal rules but also on the broader institutional environment, including electoral design and the distribution of political power.

The method of selecting judges and the independence of upper chambers are also critical. Plurality-based systems often produce majoritarian dominance that can compromise judicial autonomy, whereas proportional systems tend to foster more diverse appointments and greater judicial independence (Ginsburg, 2003). The capacity of courts to act as effective guardians of accountability is therefore closely tied to the broader institutional architecture.

## **Governance Outcomes and Institutional Quality**

Governance outcomes such as control of corruption, government effectiveness, and voice and accountability are strongly correlated with institutional quality (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Inclusive and competitive political institutions tend to reduce corruption, enhance policy effectiveness, and foster accountability (Acemoglu et al., 2001). Government social expenditure is also influenced by institutional design. Haggard and Kaufman (2008) demonstrate that proportional representation and parliamentary regimes are more likely to sustain higher levels of social spending due to broader coalition incentives and stronger redistribution pressures.

Despite these insights, the literature presents competing hypotheses regarding the effects of bicameralism, electoral rules, and political alignment on governance quality. The empirical relationships remain underexplored in a systematic, cross-country framework. This study contributes to filling this gap by analysing how institutional structures interact with political dynamics to shape governance outcomes across multiple dimensions.

### **4. Conceptual Framework**

This study situates itself within the institutionalist tradition that emphasises the way in which political and constitutional structures shape governance through incentive alignment, accountability mechanisms, and representation. Institutions are not neutral arrangements but rule-bound configurations that generate distinct pathways for political interaction and decision-making. The framework adopted here builds this perspective by connecting institutional features to measurable governance outcomes across countries.

The form of government constitutes a critical determinant of accountability. Parliamentary systems create an institutional setting in which executives are directly accountable to legislatures, thereby reinforcing incentives for coalition-building, responsiveness, and programmatic governance. In contrast, presidential systems separate executive and legislative authority. Whilst this arrangement may foster stability, it can also generate gridlock and encourage unilateral executive action, ultimately weakening oversight and accountability.

Bicameralism occupies a central place in this framework as a potential mechanism of alternative evaluation. A second chamber can function as an institutionalised ‘second look’ at policy and executive action. Where the upper chamber is independent in its composition and electoral base, bicameralism strengthens scrutiny, curtails executive dominance, and promotes inclusiveness in lawmaking. In such contexts, bicameralism enhances the control of corruption, judicial independence, voice and accountability. Conversely, when the upper house lacks autonomy or remains politically aligned with the lower chamber, bicameralism risks degenerating into duplication of majority preferences and dilution of accountability. Its effectiveness therefore depends less on its mere existence and more on the independence and diversity of representation it affords.

### **Electoral Design and Representation**

The design of electoral systems further mediates governance outcomes. Proportional representation tends to expand inclusiveness by reducing wasted votes and encouraging coalition governments. This electoral design has been associated with greater welfare expenditure and stronger representation of minority interests. By contrast, plurality systems, whilst providing clarity of mandate, often generate majoritarian dominance and weaker judicial or legislative checks. The method, through which the upper house is constituted, similarly determines whether bicameralism operates as a genuine mechanism of oversight or merely reproduces executive control.

### **Political Alignment, Polarisation, and Judicial Independence**

Political alignment and polarisation interact with these structural features in decisive ways. When chambers and executives are aligned, the probability of effective checks and oversight is significantly

reduced. Polarisation may sharpen scrutiny by intensifying opposition oversight, but excessive polarisation risks legislative deadlock and declining government effectiveness. Judicial independence represents another crucial intermediary. Stronger checks and diverse representation protect judicial autonomy, which in turn underpins rule of law and reinforces control of corruption.

## **Pathways to Governance Outcomes**

Taken together, institutional structures shape political incentives, which then determine whether effective mechanisms of oversight and accountability emerge. These mechanisms may take the form of bicameral review, judicial independence, or opposition scrutiny. The outcomes of these processes are manifested in levels of corruption control, government effectiveness, judicial integrity, accountability, and social expenditure. In this sense, bicameralism is not simply an institutional form but rather a functional mechanism of alternative evaluation whose performance depends on independence, composition, and political context.

## **Link to Empirical Investigation**

The conceptual model guiding this study therefore links constitutional and electoral design to governance outcomes through the mediating effects of political incentives and alternative evaluation mechanisms. Empirical investigation operationalises this framework by measuring institutional structures such as parliamentary systems, bicameralism, proportional representation, and political alignment, and by estimating their effects on governance outcomes using standardised cross-country indicators including the Worldwide Governance Indicators, indices of judicial independence, and social expenditure data. The integration of bicameralism as an explicit alternative evaluation mechanism connects institutional design with governance performance in a way that is both theoretically grounded and empirically testable.

## **5. Methodology**

### **5.1 Data**

This study draws on multiple authoritative datasets to capture the institutional, political, and macroeconomic variables of interest. Institutional and electoral characteristics are obtained from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Scartascini et al., 2021), which provides systematic measures of checks and balances, government tenure and stability, party affiliation and ideology, and the degree of fragmentation among governing and opposition parties in the legislature, among other indicators. Political constraints are measured using the Political Constraint Index (POLCON) dataset (Henisz, 2022), which quantifies the extent to which a political system's institutional structure limits the discretion of policymakers.

Macroeconomic performance is proxied by gross domestic product (GDP) data sourced from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank (World Bank, 2025). Governance-related variables are derived from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), which encompass multiple dimensions of governance quality, including voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.

The number of countries in the judiciary model is 34 whilst the number of countries in the rest of the models is 108.

### **5.2 Variables**

This study employs a set of institutional, governance, and economic variables drawn from established international datasets. Governance quality indicators are sourced from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), each ranging from  $-2.5$  to  $+2.5$ , where higher values denote stronger governance performance. Institutional characteristics are primarily obtained from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), whilst political constraints and related variables are drawn from the Political Constraint Index (POLCON) dataset. Economic performance

is captured through per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) from the World Development Indicators (WDI).

The operational definitions, coding schemes, ranges, and data sources for all variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 1.

**Table 1. Variable Definitions, Coding, and Sources**

Variable	Definition	Coding / Range	Source
Control of Corruption (CC_est)	Perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain.	-2.5 to +2.5	WGI
Government Effectiveness (GE_est)	Quality of public services, civil service, and policy formulation.	-2.5 to +2.5	WGI
Voice and Accountability (VA_est)	Extent of citizen participation in selecting government and freedom of expression.	-2.5 to +2.5	WGI
Judiciary (J)	Presence of an independent judiciary.	1 = Yes	POLCON
Government social expenditure (gov_soc_exp)	Government social expenditure measured by the sum of public spending on health and education.	Continuous scale	WDI
Bicameralism	Presence of an upper house in the legislature.	1 = Yes; 0 = No	DPI
Political system (system)	Type of political system.	0 = Presidential; 1 = Assembly-elected president; 2 = Parliamentary	DPI
Alignment Houses (Align1_12)	Alignment between parties in power in both houses.	1 = Same party in both houses; 0 = Otherwise	POLCON
Polarization (Polariz)	Political polarisation between governing and opposition parties.	Continuous scale	DPI
System of Senate (sensys)	Selection method for most upper house representatives.	1 = Plurality; 0 = Proportional Representation	DPI
Military	Chief executive is a military officer.	1 = Yes; 0 = No	DPI
Proportional Representation (PR)	Electoral system type.	1 = Proportional Representation; 0 = Otherwise	DPI
Gdp_pc_ppp	Per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP).	Continuous (USD)	WDI

Source: Authors' analysis

### 5.3 Empirical Analysis

The empirical analysis investigates the relationship between institutional configurations, governance indicators, and specific political characteristics. The estimation is based on a panel data framework, where the dependent variable varies across five models to capture different dimensions of governance and institutional performance.

Models (1)– (3) employ the Worldwide Governance Indicators as dependent variables: Control of Corruption ( $Cc\_est$ ), Government Effectiveness ( $Ge\_est$ ), and Voice and Accountability ( $Va\_est$ ). Model (4) uses Government Social Expenditure ( $gov\_soc\_exp$ ), whilst Model (5) examines the presence of an independent judiciary ( $J$ ) as the dependent variable.

The core explanatory variables include the presence of bicameralism, type of political system, party alignment between legislative chambers, political polarisation, selection methods for upper house representatives, whether the chief executive has a military background, electoral system type, and economic performance measured by per capita GDP (PPP). A time trend is included to account for systematic changes over time.

The baseline panel data specification takes the following general form:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Bicameralism_{it} + \beta_2 System_{it} + \beta_3 Align1\_l2_{it} + \beta_4 Polariz_{it} + \beta_5 Sensys_{it} + \beta_6 Military_{it} + \beta_7 PR_{it} + \beta_8 Gdp\_pc\_ppp_{it} + \beta_9 Year_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where  $i$  indexes countries and  $t$  indexes years.

The five estimated models are as follows:

**Model 1:**

$$Cc\_est_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Bicameralism_{it} + \beta_2 System_{it} + \beta_3 Align1\_l2_{it} + \beta_4 Polariz_{it} + \beta_5 Sensys_{it} + \beta_6 Military_{it} + \beta_7 PR_{it} + \beta_8 Gdp\_pc\_ppp_{it} + \beta_9 Year_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

**Model 2:**

$$Ge\_est_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Bicameralism_{it} + \beta_2 System_{it} + \beta_3 Align1\_l2_{it} + \beta_4 Polariz_{it} + \beta_5 Sensys_{it} + \beta_6 Military_{it} + \beta_7 PR_{it} + \beta_8 Gdp\_pc\_ppp_{it} + \beta_9 Year_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

**Model 3:**

$$Va\_est_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Bicameralism_{it} + \beta_2 System_{it} + \beta_3 Align1\_l2_{it} + \beta_4 Polariz_{it} + \beta_5 Sensys_{it} + \beta_6 Military_{it} + \beta_7 PR_{it} + \beta_8 Gdp\_pc\_ppp_{it} + \beta_9 Year_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

**Model 4:**

$$J_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Bicameralism_{it} + \beta_2 System_{it} + \beta_3 Align1\_l2_{it} + \beta_4 Polariz_{it} + \beta_5 Sensys_{it} + \beta_6 Military_{it} + \beta_7 PR_{it} + \beta_8 Gdp\_pc\_ppp_{it} + \beta_9 Year_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

**Model 5:**

$$Gove\_soc\_exp_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Bicameralism_{it} + \beta_2 System_{it} + \beta_3 Align1\_l2_{it} + \beta_4 Polariz_{it} + \beta_5 Sensys_{it} + \beta_6 Military_{it} + \beta_7 PR_{it} + \beta_8 Gdp\_pc\_ppp_{it} + \beta_9 Year_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Estimation is conducted using fixed effects to control for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity, with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. The within, between, and overall R-squared values are reported for each model to assess model fit.

## 6. Result

Regression table

	(1) Control of Corruption (CC_est)	(2) Government Effectiveness (GE_est)	(3) Voice and Accountability (VA_est)	(4) Government social expenditure (gov_ soc_exp)	(5) Judiciary (J)
Bicameralism	-0.287*** (-2.800)	-0.187* (-1.844)	-0.244*** (-2.917)	2.739*** (3.228)	0.016 (0.047)
Presidential (system = 0)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Assembly Elected President (system = 1)	0.453*** (3.821)	-0.217* (-1.857)	0.351*** (3.628)	-1.070 (-1.031)	-0.003 (-0.015)
Parliamentary (system = 2)	0.297*** (3.332)	0.081 (0.922)	0.444*** (6.091)	-0.741 (-1.210)	0.567** (2.223)
Alignment of Houses (align1_l2)	-0.036** (-2.019)	-0.001 (-0.042)	0.011 (0.793)	0.081 (0.829)	-0.033 (-1.420)
Polarization (polariz=0)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Polarization (polariz=1)	-0.020 (-0.773)	0.034 (1.368)	0.029 (1.371)	0.087 (0.580)	-0.012 (-0.395)
Polarization (polariz=2)	-0.038* (-1.834)	-0.037* (-1.827)	-0.017 (-0.995)	0.091 (0.762)	0.028 (1.130)
System of Senate (sensys)	0.000*** (3.847)	0.000 (0.784)	0.000*** (4.411)	-0.001* (-1.816)	-0.000*** (-2.639)
Military	0.248*** (3.967)	-0.207*** (-3.360)	0.220*** (4.317)	-0.161 (-0.192)	-0.024 (-0.136)
PR	-0.145* (-1.717)	-0.523*** (-6.298)	0.009 (0.125)	-0.610 (-0.837)	-0.846*** (-3.936)
gdp_pc_ppp	-0.000 (-0.152)	-0.000*** (-3.447)	0.000 (0.994)	-0.000*** (-3.215)	0.000 (0.881)
year	-0.005*** (-2.863)	0.002 (1.012)	-0.003*** (-2.703)	0.155*** (15.259)	-0.005* (-1.874)
_cons	4.084 (0.813)	-22.205*** (-4.480)	7.610* (1.856)	-313.453*** (-12.712)	11.418** (1.988)
N	896	896	896	756	500
R2	0.087	0.093	0.120	0.426	0.180
Adj. R2	-0.05	-0.04	-0.01	0.33	0.10

Source: Authors' analysis

## 7. Findings and Discussion

The regression results indicate that institutional configurations exert a substantial influence on governance outcomes. Bicameral legislatures are negatively associated with control of corruption, government effectiveness, and voice and accountability, but positively related to government social expenditure. By contrast, parliamentary systems (system = 2) consistently exhibit higher values for all three governance indicators, with the strongest association observed for voice and accountability relative to presidential systems.

Political alignment and electoral design also appear to shape institutional quality. Control of corruption tends to be lower when the same party holds power in both the upper and lower chambers, suggesting that diminished inter-branch political competition may reduce oversight effectiveness. Moreover, judicial independence is significantly weaker when the upper house is constituted through plurality-based elections rather than proportional representation, potentially due to majoritarian dominance and a narrower range of political representation. However, plurality-based upper houses are positively associated with control of corruption and voice and accountability, indicating that the relationship between electoral design and governance performance is multidimensional.

The analysis further reveals that parliamentary systems are more likely to sustain an independent judiciary than presidential or semi-presidential systems. This pattern may reflect the presence of stronger institutional checks and balances, more stable executive–legislative relations, and a greater degree of insulation of judicial appointments from partisan influence in parliamentary regimes. The indirect nature of executive selection in such systems may limit incentives to politicise the judiciary, thereby reinforcing its autonomy.

## 8. Limitations

Whilst the study provides important insights into the relationship between institutional design and governance outcomes, several limitations should be acknowledged. First, the analysis relies on cross-country panel data, which may mask country-specific contextual factors that influence institutional performance. The governance indicators used, such as control of corruption and government effectiveness, are derived from perception-based measures, which could be subject to reporting biases and variations in measurement standards across countries. These variables also are limited to measurement proceeding from 1995 which prevents us from incorporating event-study designs due to lack of variation in shifting from unicameral to bicameral structures. There is possible endogeneity in the relationship between governance outcomes and legislature structure, as the structures may be subject to reform due to shocks in governance outcomes. The study treats bicameralism and electoral design as broad structural features, but it does not fully account for the internal functioning, procedural rules, or cultural norms of individual parliaments, which may moderate the observed effects. The cross-sectional differences in political history, economic development, and institutional maturity may interact with formal structures in ways that are not captured by the models. Findings regarding judicial independence and electoral design are suggestive rather than causal, given the potential for unobserved factors influencing both institutional configuration and governance outcomes. Finally, whilst the study incorporates both parliamentary and presidential systems, the heterogeneity of semi-presidential and hybrid regimes may require more nuanced analysis to fully understand their governance dynamics.

## 9. Policy Implications

The findings carry several important implications for institutional reform and governance policy. The negative association of bicameral legislatures with control of corruption, government effectiveness, and voice and accountability suggests that simply creating an upper house is not a guaranteed solution for improving governance. Instead, careful attention must be paid to the design, composition, and electoral mechanisms of the upper chamber to ensure that it functions as an effective oversight body rather than a duplication of existing legislative authority. Proportional representation in upper house elections appears

to support judicial independence, indicating that inclusive and representative electoral mechanisms may strengthen institutional checks and balances.

The results also highlight the benefits of parliamentary systems for governance quality, particularly in sustaining an independent judiciary and enhancing citizen participation. Policymakers in unicameral systems seeking to improve governance may therefore consider reforms that emulate some characteristics of parliamentary systems, such as strengthening legislative oversight, promoting inter-party deliberation, and insulating judicial appointments from executive influence.

Additionally, the observed effect of political alignment underscores the importance of maintaining competitive inter-branch dynamics. Ensuring that legislative and executive powers are not fully aligned may enhance oversight and reduce opportunities for corruption. Policy measures could include empowering parliamentary committees, ensuring transparency in legislative deliberations, and implementing institutional mechanisms that allow for meaningful opposition participation.

In the context of Bangladesh, these findings suggest that structural reforms, including proposals for bicameralism, must be accompanied by procedural and electoral safeguards that prevent the concentration of power in a single party or chamber. Strengthening committee systems, protecting judicial autonomy, and designing inclusive upper house elections could make parliamentary reforms more effective in enhancing transparency, accountability, and social welfare outcomes.

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