State of Governance in the Banking Sector

Dealing with the Recent Shocks

Fahmida Khatun

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Dr Fahmida Khatun is the Research Director of CPD.

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INTRODUCTION

Banking sector is one of the most important components of the financial system that mobilises resources for productive investments in a country, which in turn contributes to economic development. The relationship between financial sector development and economic growth has been explored in several studies in the recent past. Cross-country empirical evidence suggests a positive association between financial development and economic growth (Ahmed and Ansari 1998; CPD 2011; Monnin and Jokipii 2010; McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973; Calderón and Liu 2002; Rahman 2004; Chakraborty 2008; Khan 2008; Khan and Senhadji 2000). On the other hand, crisis, volatility and corruption in the banking sector have been found to have negative implications for the growth of the banking industry (Park 2012; Moshirian and Wu 2012; Lin and Huang 2012; Serwa 2010).

In Bangladesh, financial sector is dominated by banks. In 2011 total asset of the banking sector was 74.6 per cent, and of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) 3.4 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) (GoB 2012; Bangladesh Bank 2012). The banking sector has flourished during the last three decades or so as a result of increased demand of the growing economy. During this period the banking sector has also undergone several reforms and fallen under the jurisdiction of a number of acts in the bid to improve the efficiency of the sector. Nevertheless, the sector is yet to improve its performance in terms of trust and confidence of people as shocks hit the sector from time to time in a major way. Among these, the issue of governance in the banking sector has currently been under the spotlight in the context of the Hall-Mark scam which has been the biggest financial crime in the history of Bangladesh’s banking sector. Given the contribution of the banking sector in the overall development of the country, such processes of misappropriating public resources can have serious implications for economic growth of the country.

This chapter will discuss some of the challenges confronting the banking industry of Bangladesh, particularly focusing on the state-owned commercial banks (SCBs) in view of the Hall-Mark case. Hence the major objective of the study is to examine how far the exposed performance indicators of the SCBs are credible, and whether the SCBs have been able to meet the emerging domestic and global demands in terms of better services and newer products. The chapter also makes a number of recommendations for a healthy banking sector and to prepare for the emerging challenges.

The chapter is structured in the following manner. The introductory section is followed by an overview of the performance of the banking sector in Section 3.2. This section also includes a brief discussion on the major reforms in the banking sector of the country since independence. Section 3.3 discusses the challenges of the sector in view of the recently exposed fraudulent practices of the Hall-Mark group. The chapter presents a set of key recommendations in Section 3.4 based on the lessons learnt from the Hall-Mark case. These suggestions are made with a view to ensuring a healthy and sustainable growth of the banking sector in the country. Finally, some concluding remarks have been made in Section 3.5.
3.2 OVERVIEW OF THE BANKING SECTOR

3.2.1 Performance and Progress

The pace of development for the banking industry has been significant over the past decades. In calendar year (CY) 2011 total asset of 47 commercial banks stood at Tk. 58,749 crore and deposit at Tk. 45,098 crore. During the last ten years (2001-2011) total asset has grown by 324.2 per cent while deposit has increased by 326.9 per cent (Bangladesh Bank 2012). Total deposit is currently 51 per cent of GDP of the country. The ratios of money supply to GDP, total deposits to GDP and total domestic credit to GDP have shown steady increase over the years indicating an increased financial depth. In comparison to other South Asian countries Bangladesh stands behind India and Nepal (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1
Financial Depth in South Asian Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Sri Lanka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money Supply-GDP</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposit-GDP</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit-GDP</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *denotes data of 2010.

Financial inclusion, though still low compared to developing countries, have increased significantly since independence. Population per bank branch has reduced from 57,700 in 1972 to 17,660 in June 2011, indicating the wider coverage of banking services, and increase in the number of people included in the formal financial sector. However, there is still a large untapped market for the banking industry as a large number of people remain outside the banking services. Sarma (2008) developed an index of financial inclusion using data on three dimensions of financial inclusion and compared it among 55 countries. Bangladesh ranked 43, while India ranked 29 as per this index.

In line with Basel II requirement, to measure capital adequacy banks have now adopted the Basel minimum capital requirement in a phased manner.

Soundness of the banking sector, which basically reflects on the quality of performance of the sector, is measured by indicators such as Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management Quality, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to Market Risks (CAMELS). In 1996, Bangladesh Bank adopted Basel I replacing the liability-to-capital approach with the risk-based capital approach which was adopted in 1991. Minimum capital requirement (MCR) was 8 per cent of risk weighted asset (RWA) with 4 per cent core capital. In 2002, MCR was raised to 9 per cent of RWA with 4.5 per cent of core capital. In line with Basel II requirement, to measure capital adequacy banks have now adopted the Basel minimum capital requirement in a phased manner. Accordingly, during January to June 2010 the minimum capital of banks was 8 per cent of RWA with core capital equal to 4 per cent of RWA; for the July 2010 to June 2011 period these rates were 9 per cent and 4.5 per cent respectively. Since July 2011 the minimum capital of banks should be 10 per cent of RWA with core capital equivalent to 5 per cent of RWA.

1 In India, for example, population per bank branch was 13,466 in FY2010-11 (Reserve Bank of India; available at: http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_SpeechesView.aspx?id=669; accessed on 2 November 2012).
Over the last few years the banking sector of Bangladesh has made significant progress with regard to these indicators. As shown in Table 3.2, in the recent past the situation of banks in terms of capital adequacy has improved and they have been able to maintain adequate RWA capital. The percentage share of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total loans has reduced dramatically during 1997 to 2011. Similarly there were improvements in the case of bank management, profitability and liquidity. However, a disaggregated performance of these indicators for different categories of banks shows that the performance of the SCBs has been weaker than other categories of banks (Table 3.3).

Table 3.2
Soundness of Banking Sector Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital to Risk Weighted Asset (%)</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>10.10</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>11.30</td>
<td>11.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Performing Loan to Total Loans (%)</td>
<td>17.60</td>
<td>13.20</td>
<td>10.80</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>7.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure-Income Ratio (%)</td>
<td>90.90</td>
<td>91.40</td>
<td>87.90</td>
<td>70.90</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on Asset (%)</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on Equity (%)</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>14.10</td>
<td>15.60</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>13.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid Asset (%)</td>
<td>23.40</td>
<td>21.50</td>
<td>24.80</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>27.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess Liquidity (%)</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>9.21</td>
<td>18.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensitivity to Risks</td>
<td>20.30</td>
<td>31.50</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bangladesh Bank.
Note: NA denotes not available.

Table 3.3
Performance of Various Types of Banks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Bank Type</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011 (June)</th>
<th>2012 (June)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital Adequacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCBs</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>6.90</td>
<td>8.90</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>11.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFIs</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>-6.70</td>
<td>-5.30</td>
<td>-7.30</td>
<td>-7.00</td>
<td>-7.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCBs</td>
<td>10.30</td>
<td>9.80</td>
<td>11.40</td>
<td>10.10</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>10.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCBs</td>
<td>24.20</td>
<td>22.70</td>
<td>24.00</td>
<td>15.60</td>
<td>17.10</td>
<td>17.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Quality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCBs</td>
<td>25.30</td>
<td>22.90</td>
<td>25.40</td>
<td>15.70</td>
<td>14.10</td>
<td>12.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFIs</td>
<td>42.90</td>
<td>33.70</td>
<td>25.50</td>
<td>24.20</td>
<td>21.80</td>
<td>23.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCBs</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCBs</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCBs</td>
<td>102.30</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>89.60</td>
<td>80.70</td>
<td>65.90</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFIs</td>
<td>104.00</td>
<td>103.50</td>
<td>103.70</td>
<td>87.80</td>
<td>101.70</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCBs</td>
<td>87.10</td>
<td>90.20</td>
<td>88.40</td>
<td>67.60</td>
<td>69.10</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCBs</td>
<td>76.30</td>
<td>71.10</td>
<td>75.80</td>
<td>64.70</td>
<td>45.40</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profitability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCBs</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFIs</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCBs</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCBs</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Tables 3.2 and 3.3 contd.)
Even though there have been improved performance, the SCBs continue to be grappled with problems of inefficiency and solvency. Thus the seemingly good performance does not capture the reality which raises elements of doubts as regards to the real health of SCBs.

3.2.2 Reforms in the Banking Sector

The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) played an active role in functioning of the economy as it envisaged a socialist economy after independence in 1971. As a result the government had a greater involvement in various sectors of the economy including in banking and finance. The commercial and specialised banks were under the control of the government.

The government embarked on a policy of liberalisation, through denationalising the nationalised commercial banks (NCBs) in the 1980s. In view of the deteriorated performance and inefficient resource management, the government decided to open up the banking sector and adopt a number of reforms for the sector. As part of the reform process two of the six NCBs were denationalised, and a few commercial banks were given license to operate in the private sector to create competition in the banking sector. The reform process accelerated towards the end of 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s under the directions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The National Commission on Money, Banking and Credit was constituted in 1986 to look into the problems of the banking sector and suggest ways to overcome those under the direction of the World Bank. The Commission pointed out, among others, problems relating to the supervisory task of Bangladesh Bank, overall structure of the banking sector, and pointed out that non-performing assets (NPAs) required improvement. The consequent Financial Sector Reforms Programme (FSRP) and Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (FSAC) carried out in the 1990s were geared towards implementation of various reform measures in the financial sector. The objectives of these measures were to liberalise interest rate, enhance the capacity of loan classification and provisioning, capital restructuring and risk analysis, strengthening the central bank, and improving the legal system and framework for loan recovery.
Following the phase out of the FSRP in 1996, subsequent governments continued to undertake reform measures in the financial sector. The Commission on Banking and the Banking Reform Committee were formed in 1998 and 2002 respectively to make recommendations for the improvement of the performance of banks. A bill was passed in the National Parliament in 2003 to bring more reforms in the banking sector. Most important of the relevant initiatives was the Bangladesh Bank Amendment Bill 2003 through which Bangladesh Bank received the autonomy to operate on its own and also to formulate the monetary policy. The World Bank and the GoB undertook a reform initiative called the Central Bank Strengthening Project (CBSP) to put in place a strong and effective regulatory and supervisory system for the banking sector of the country. The focus of this project was on three broad areas, such as (i) strengthening the legal framework; (ii) reorganisation and modernisation of Bangladesh Bank; and (iii) capacity building of Bangladesh Bank.

Another major reform attempt was the corporatisation of four SCBs into limited companies, and restructuring of three SCBs in 2007 to operate as more of a commercial entity. Supported by the World Bank and monitored by Bangladesh Bank, the reform initiative included measures such as selection of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Deputy Managing Director (DMD) and four General Managers (GMs) of the SCBs through a competitive process, and fixation of the compensation package that was commensurate with the private sector and in accordance with respective performance records. Monitorable goals were set for cash recovery of NPLs, limits on new NPLs, operations, computerisation, income and profitability, increased net worth and disclosure.

As can be seen from Table 3.3, since the corporatisation of the SCBs there have been some improvements in terms of achievement of the goals that were set out. The SCBs, for the first time, did earn profit in 2008, which they also continued afterwards. The NPL has reduced and the management performance has also increased which is reflected through lower expenditure-income ratio.

However, the reform initiatives for the banking sector in Bangladesh have not been able to deliver the expected results. Achievements in terms of efficient resource allocation through disbursement of credit to productive sectors, prudent risk analysis, supervisory and management quality have not been encouraging in many banks even after so many reforms since independence. Moreover, lack of governance has been featured prominently in the recent years in several banks including the SCBs. This only suggests that reform is still an unfinished agenda in the banking sector of Bangladesh.

3.3

ANATOMY OF THE HALL-MARK INCIDENCE

As is revealed from the previous section, higher credit expansion, increased profitability, lower NPAs and increased financial inclusion have contributed to an improved banking system during the past decade. The regulatory framework has supported this growth to a large extent. It may be worth to note that at a time when major economies of the world are under tremendous pressure due to the second wave of financial crisis and bankruptcy of financial institutions and sovereign debt crisis, the banking sector of Bangladesh has been navigating through in a resilient manner.
However, recent shocks in the banking sector have exposed the vulnerability of the seemingly resilient financial systems in the country. Despite some positive results initially after the reform in 2007, the SCBs unfortunately could not sustain the momentum due to poor supervisory capacity and weak institutional framework. As a result, not only these banks are suffering from shortages of capital but their profitability has also started to decline (Table 3.3). Additionally, incidences of irregularities have weakened the overall performance and threatened the stability of the banking industry. The recently detected Hall-Mark case of forgery through inland bills trade involving the largest SCB of the country, the Sonali Bank Limited (SBL), is a testimony to poor management, weak internal control and risk management, and above all, total lack of governance on the part of the bank. Shocks in the banking sector of such nature and extent will not only hamper the growth of the banking industry, but can also risk the economic growth of the country. Information provided in Box 3.1 support such claim. This is the most despicable financial forgery in the banking history of Bangladesh which has surpassed all the earlier cases of misappropriation of resources from banks.

Box 3.1: Unauthorised Loans and Advances: A Record of Sonali Bank – Ruposhi Bangla Branch

The recently unearthed incidence of financial irregularities at the Ruposhi Bangla branch of Sonali Bank Limited reveals that as on 31 May 2012 total outstanding loans and advances related to international trade was Tk. 3,699.53 crore, of which funded and non-funded unauthorised loans and advances was Tk. 3,606.48 crore. These unauthorised bank loan facilities were given by the General Manager and Assistant Manager of the branch to Hall-Mark Group (Tk. 2,667.45 crore), T and Brothers Group (Tk. 685.63 crore), Paragon Group (Tk. 144.44 crore), DN Sports Group (Tk. 28.54 crore), Nakshi Knit Group (Tk. 65.3 crore), and others (Tk. 15.12 crore).

These loans and advances were given by disregarding the rules and regulations of the bank. Besides branch officials did not maintain relevant documentation properly on purpose. A significant fund was misappropriated through the inland bills trading. The branch opened inland letters of credit (L/Cs) in favour of three fictitious spinning mills which were customers of the said branch on account of another company, a concern of the Hall-Mark Group. The branch transferred the money to the accounts of the three companies which after a few days advised the bank to transfer the money to the account of Hall-Mark Group.

The Branch Manager resorted to a number of unauthorised ways to disburse huge amount of money to Hall-Mark Group and other customers. Some of these are as follows:

- Provided credit facilities without any sanction;
- Allowed credit facilities after the expiry of sanctioned period;
- Illegally opened local back-to-back L/Cs and provided acceptance to documents raised by different banks in favour of non-existent spinning and textile mills on account of Hall-Mark Group, T and Brothers Group, Paragon Group, DN Sports Group and Nakshi Knit Group;
- Illegally opened local back-to-back L/Cs and provided acceptance to documents raised by inter/intra branch customers namely Star Spinning Mills, Max Spinning Mills, Anwara Spinning Mills and Master Cotton Yarn Ltd. on account of Hall-Mark Group and T and Brothers Group;

Some of the previous cases of bank frauds include Tk. 300 crore by Om Prakash Agarwal in 2002 through transfer from five banks; Tk. 596 crore through withdrawal without cheques by the owners of the Oriental Bank in 2006; and Tk. 622 crore by Nurunnabi in 2007 through fake letters of credit (L/Cs).
CHAPTER THREE

State of the Bangladesh Economy in FY2011-12

(Box 3.1 contd.)

- Created unauthorised fresh loans to adjust unauthorised overdue loans;
- Provided loan against fake export documents of Hall-Mark Group, T and Brothers Group, Paragon Knit Composite Ltd. and Nakshi Knit Composite Ltd.;
- Provided excess pre-shipment credits (PSC) over approved limit;
- Allowed PSC without L/Cs;
- Allowed PSC after shipment date;
- Opened cash L/Cs without customer’s existing liabilities and limits;
- Opened cash L/Cs for capital machinery at zero margin without the approval of the Head Office of the bank;
- Foreign Currency Management Division (FCMD) debited Head Office NOSTRO account without obtaining reimbursement from the branch;
- Reported irregular Payment Against Documents loans as regular in classified loan report;
- Opened foreign back-to-back L/Cs without office note and realising commission;
- Transferred fund illegally by debiting sundry deposit accounts;
- Purchased export bills before completion of exports;
- Applied incorrect exchange rates for purchasing deferred payment export bills;
- Overdue export bills were not reported to the central bank; and
- Allowed temporary overdraft illegally against cash incentives.


3.3.1 Magnitude of the Hall-Mark Scam

In a resource-constraint country such as Bangladesh where the government has to struggle for allocating resources among competing priorities, Tk. 3,606.48 crore have significant implications for public investment. Box 3.2 reveals why this scam is too important to be ignored exclusively on economic grounds. One may also wonder why does the country bows down to stringent conditionalities of donors for the construction of infrastructural projects when domestic resources are being plundered in this manner.

Box 3.2: What is the Value of Tk. 3,606.48 Crore?

Tk. 3,606.48 crore is equivalent to:

- 320.6 per cent of Sonali Bank’s paid up capital!
- 6.6 per cent of Annual Development Programme (ADP) of FY2012-13
- 15.9 per cent of allocation for social safety net programme in FY2012-13
- 38.6 per cent of allocation for health in FY2012-13
- 16.8 per cent of allocation for education in FY2012-13
- 0.3 per cent of projected GDP of FY2012-13
- 15.0 per cent of the finance requirement of the Padma Bridge
- 42.9 per cent of the envisaged support by the World Bank for the Padma Bridge

Source: Compiled by the author.

It is also alarming to observe that SBL disbursed an amount equivalent to almost 237 per cent of the paid up capital of SBL only to Hall-Mark Group; this is an utter violation of the ‘Single Party Exposure Limit’. Bangladesh Bank has determined that banks cannot give loan more than 35 per cent of its

—

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Tk. 3,606.48 crore is equivalent to 6.6 per cent of ADP of FY2012-13

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As on 31 December 2011, SBL had a paid up capital of Tk. 1,125 crore (http://www.sonalibank.com.bd/PDF_file/fs2011.pdf; accessed on 24 October 2012).
capital to any individual, enterprise or group, of which funded loan should not exceed 15 per cent of bank’s capital. In case of the export sector, a client can be granted a loan up to 50 per cent of bank’s capital, of which funded loan has to be kept within 15 per cent of bank’s capital.

3.3.2 Fault Lines of the Hall-Mark Episode

It is more or less clear now that weak risk management, pressure exerted by powerful sections, connivance and unholy alliance between senior managers of the bank and the client, lack of supervision from the Head Office of the bank, oversight of the Board and lack of regulatory hindsight had been the reasons behind the embezzlement of this huge amount of money from a small branch of SBL. As is shown in Box 3.1, irregularities were of various natures and at a large scale. This cannot be performed by a sole manager of a small branch. A number of reasons have been identified by the audit team which helped this forgery to happen. These are summarised below:

a. The Branch Manager was posted in the same branch for five years exceeding the limit of three years at one branch. The Principal’s office of the bank warned the manager back in 2007 about some irregularities. Again in 2010, serious irregularities relating to international trade were found by the GM office and International Trade Finance Division (ITFD) of the Head Office. However, no steps were taken by the ITFD to regularise the irregularities of the said branch of the bank.

b. Neither the budgeting and monitoring department nor the ITFD of the bank did inquire about the huge growth of loans and advances of the branch. No detailed inspection was carried out to investigate abnormal increase of loans and advances. On the contrary, Inspection and Audit Division (IAD)-2 of the Head Office graded the branch as ‘Low Risk’ branch in February 2011, and they did not mention any irregularities. More shocking is that the IAD-2 commended the Branch Manager saying that he was “managing the branch efficiently with his extraordinary talent, foresight and banking knowledge.” One can easily understand how the Branch Manager was encouraged to continue the unethical activities!

c. Since June 2010 the management of the bank introduced a detailed monthly report on branches containing 85 columns. A close scrutiny of this factsheet can reveal the status of branches. However, it seems these reports were not reviewed properly by the GM office, and the CEO also overlooked these reports.

d. There was a general reluctance towards inspection and audit of the Ruposhi Bangla branch even after complaints of irregularities were made. Principal’s office requested the Deputy General Manager (DGM) of ITFD and IAD-2 to carry out inspection of the branch on its irregularities. But none of the bodies acted on this. The branch was brought under the supervision of the GM office since July 2011. No quarterly inspection was undertaken till 31 January 2012. On 26 January 2012 the ITFD finally put up a note for inspection of the branch. However, the inspection began after two months.

e. The irregularities were easy to be carried out by the branch due to the absence of an automated transaction system with central control and monitoring facilities.
LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The recent financial scam is an eye-opening incident for all associated with banking sector as well as the policymakers exposing the inherent weaknesses of the banking sector of the country. In view of the recent irregularities, appropriate measures ought to be undertaken in the short to the medium-term towards improved performance of the sector. This should range from proper investigation and punishment of involved persons to improvement of the monitoring and governance of the SCBs. Specific recommendations are the followings:

3.4.1 Absence of Risk Management Policy

Absence of a comprehensive risk management policy in many banks makes it difficult to handle fraud and other extraordinary cases. Bangladesh Bank has identified six core risks and asked banks to formulate and implement appropriate guidelines on those. These core risks include the following: (i) Credit Risk Management; (ii) Foreign Exchange Risk Management; (iii) Asset-Liability Risk Management; (iv) Internal Control and Compliance Risk Management; (v) Money Laundering Prevention Risk Management; and (vi) Guidelines on Information and Communication Technology. Needless to say, these guidelines are hardly followed by most of the banks, especially the SCBs. The manual for loans and advances containing policies, procedures, processing and reporting transactions, review of security and collateral and responsibilities at different levels is not followed by many banks due to which it becomes difficult for them to handle and manage clients with various levels of exposures.

3.4.2 Lack of Internal Control

The Internal Control Department which ought to be the most critically important department of any bank is weak in the SCBs. This is mainly due to incentive failure which prevents hiring of qualified persons for this department. As the nature of the job involves patient scrutiny of compliance, people are reluctant to work here, and those who do, are often in a way dumped in this department. Absence of information technology (IT) makes their work even more boring. Bangladesh Bank guidelines on internal control require that if there is any incidence of a loss equivalent to Tk. 1 crore the Board of Directors of Banks should be informed immediately. Besides, any major irregularities, fraud and embezzlement have to be presented through a report during the monthly assessment of banks. In the case of Hall-Mark scam it seems that the bank management was hiding the illegal activities in the said branch for a prolonged period.

3.4.3 Political Baggage of the Board of Directors

The tradition and practice of appointing Directors of the Board of the SCBs based on the political loyalty and affiliation have to be changed. Members of the Board of the SCBs should be independent, qualified, efficient and socially acceptable persons with unquestionable integrity. Bangladesh Bank Guidelines 2010 for the Directors of banks spelt out the ‘Fit and Proper Test Criteria’ for the nomination of Directors along with their responsibilities and power. These criteria are yet to be implemented fully. Due to political baggage, Directors of SCBs cannot perform their duties independently and remain morally obliged to listen to political instructions of the government. This results in weak corporate governance. As the Board
members are also members of various committees of a bank that are constituted in order to closely guide various operations of the bank, the independence of the Audit Committee, the most important board committee which has to ensure compliance of business strategy and policy of the Board, cannot be maintained as well. Given the emerging challenges and dynamism of modern banking business, it is thus important that Directors of the Board have the pertinent knowledge and skill of running bank with efficiency and sincerity.

The accountability of the Directors should also be determined clearly. In case of the Hall-Mark scam it has been reported that the Board was not informed of the unscrupulous inland bill trading. However, the fact that the responsible branch was not audited and the accused Branch Manager was not transferred even after completion of his three years tenure are some of the issues which the Board cannot shrug off as its oversight responsibility.

3.4.4 Inappropriate Appointment of CEOs and Senior Officials

The scam has also exposed total failure of the CEO and responsible senior managers of the bank in discharging their duties. In the SCBs, preoccupation of most CEOs is to keep the Board in good humour and sing the songs the way the Board likes to hear so that their position is well-secured under any circumstances. It is difficult to find any instance where the CEO has been asked to leave the job because of bad performance. One may argue that in a setting where the Board is constituted of political candidates, the CEO is handicapped in taking any decision guided purely by banking ethics, norms and perceived risks. This however, is not a saleable point. Good business plan, effective people management programme, regulatory compliance practice, effort towards clients’ satisfaction and high work ethics of any CEO of a bank are bound to be endorsed by a Board, no matter how political it may be. Performance of CEOs should be evaluated from time to time by the Board based on the Key Performance Indicators (KPI). The Board can only guide and support the CEO to achieve the targets that are of benefit to the bank.

In appointing GMs, suggestions have been made to have a common and single selection and promotion committee under Bangladesh Bank and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) for selecting GMs, or promoting DGMs to GMs, and for posting them in different banks following their selection. GMs should also be transferred from one SCB to another in order to not only help transfer of good practices, but also to reduce the possibility of fraudulent and unethical practices.

3.4.5 Shortcomings of Human Resource Policy

Human resource (HR) development has been a neglected issue in the SCBs. As mentioned earlier, the World Bank supported reforms of 2007 recommended a number of measures for the improvement of skills and performance of the officials in the SCBs. However, the HR Department of the SCBs remains weak and powerless to take decisions on recruitment and promotion, partly due to lack of capacity, and partly due to external influence. In the modern day business, banks have to provide value added products and services to customers in addition to traditional banking functions. However, the SCBs suffer from skilled and qualified human resources for undertaking such operations. The HR policy of banks should not only arrange for appropriate training, but also should include reward and punishment practices in the banks.

3.4.6 Inertia for Automation and Management Information System (MIS)

An issue related to the HR development is the automation and Management Information System (MIS) in banks. It is apprehended by experts with fair amount of
certainty that there may be many more Hall-Mark cases that wait to be uncovered in other banks. Unless these are dug out through transparent and automated banking practices with the help of IT, the mess may get piled up and reach an unmanageable stage. Even after several reform initiatives, the inertia of the SCBs in adopting IT-based banking services and the MIS is not only disappointing but also quite surprising. Due to lack of MIS, the Hall-Mark case was not detected in time even though clearing was going against SBL continuously for many months due to loan increase in a branch of the bank.

There have been comprehensive programmes for the last several years to establish automated clearing house and credit information bureau (CIB), computerisation of the head offices and branches of all banks, electronic banking services, online corporate banking service, electronic fund transfer, automated teller machine (ATM) and internet banking. While all the FCBs and most of the PCBs have implemented these automated and electronic banking services, the SCBs are way behind in meeting these requirements. This is not only affecting their efficiency and profitability, but also giving rise to opportunities for committing scams such as the Hall-Mark. The archaic manual system of transaction records has indeed facilitated the Hall-Mark forgery. It may be mentioned here that as part of the reform programme, the World Bank had supported a consultant in the rank of the GM for IT in the SCBs for two years with a higher compensation package. The GMs for IT were supposed to work on procuring computers, developing and buying software, and training the officials. These initiatives are yet to see any meaningful result as the automation process is almost non-existent in the SCBs.

3.4.7 Dualism in the Regulatory Mechanism and Regulator’s Oversight

It is no secret that there exists a strained relationship between Bangladesh Bank and the MoF over the supervisory and regulatory role on SCBs. Though Bangladesh Bank can exercise its full authority in supervising the PCBs and FCBs, the MoF oversees the SCBs to some extent. The MoF appoints the Directors of the Board, CEOs, DMDs and GMs of the SCBs. However, due to less articulated mandate, Bangladesh Bank faces problems in implementing recommendations of audits and ensuring overall governance of the SCBs.

Full autonomy of the central banks has been suggested by many concerned stakeholders including the donors. The IMF has asked for amendment of the Banking Company Act (BCA) giving full legal supervisory and regulatory authority of Bangladesh Bank over all commercial banks within September 2012 as a precondition for contracting a loan to Bangladesh for USD 987.06 million under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) in April 2012. There has also been suggestion by many to dismantle the Banking and Financial Institutions Division at the MoF in order to keep the SCBs away from political influence. While this is necessary for smooth functioning of the banking sector, the supervisory and monitoring role of Bangladesh Bank needs to be significantly strengthened as well. Though the MoF is in the driving seat to monitor and control the SCBs, Bangladesh Bank has to perform audit and inspection in all commercial banks including the SCBs. As in the other previous financial chaos in the country such as the capital market debacle, Bangladesh Bank played a reactive role long after the irregularities have actually been taken place. Firm supervision and effective monitoring could have controlled the damage suffered by SBL. The fact that clearing of SBL was going against the bank, the amount of loan was increasing, and finally the bank became a borrower from a lender in the inter-bank market, indicates the weak off-site supervision mechanism of Bangladesh Bank.
3.4.8 Need for a Commission for the Financial Sector

Though banking sector has achieved considerable success due to the reforms in the 1990s and 2000s, the sector will have to prepare for the next generation global regulatory framework and meet emerging clients’ needs. In the coming days the banking industry will have to achieve the ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, improve risk management and governance, and strengthen bank’s transparency and disclosures through complying with Basel III requirements which is scheduled to be introduced from 2013 until 2018.

In view of the recent shocks in the banking sector and emerging challenges a Commission for the financial sector should be formed which will scrutinise the overall performance of the sector, assess the need of customers and the economy, identify the current problems and emerging challenges, and suggest concrete recommendations for prudential banking to be implemented in the short to medium terms. Considering the emerging need and in order to build up more transparent and responsible banking sector, the Commission can also include NBFIs, such as insurance companies and capital market under its jurisdiction as they are interconnected. The broad terms of reference (ToR) of the Commission will be to critically assess the problems and weaknesses of the banking industry in order to find whether there is any disconnect between demand of the growing economy and the realities of a backdated financial system that is failing to meet the emerging need. On the basis of a comprehensive scrutiny the Commission will prepare guidelines and make recommendations as regards automation, risk management, internal control, the role of various players in banks and other financial institutions.

3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Hall-Mark incident is not only a case of financial loss, but also a deep dent on the confidence and trust of the customers of the bank. It is also not the loss of good will of the particular bank only, but of the total banking industry. Such an erosion of reputation of banks could have multiple chain effect including reduction of deposit in the concerned bank and fall of share prices of the whole banking sector. This can also constrain the role of the banking sector in catalysing the growth of the economy. Without radical changes in the banking practices in the country such expectations may remain largely unfulfilled. During the run-up to attaining the ambition of being a middle-income country, there is a need to significantly strengthen the banking industry if goals are to be realised. From the 1990s onwards, the Bangladesh economy has evolved and the banking sector has evolved as well. With the speed up of economic growth through higher investment, the demand on the banking sector will still be higher. This reiterates the need for improved efficiency of the sector in terms of resource allocation for the productive sectors and management. As the global regulatory environment is becoming tighter, global economic environment is facing more volatility and resources are getting more scarce, banks in Bangladesh will have to find innovative ways to conduct their business. There will be demand for higher capital and skilled human resources for smooth functioning of banks and for ensuring compliance in the coming days. Therefore, the banking sector in Bangladesh has to focus on using both its financial as well as human resources in a far more innovative and efficient way to cater to the demands of the future.
REFERENCES


