Originally posted in Asia Democracy Chronicles on 30 August 2024
“It [India-Bangladesh relationship] has become multifaceted,” concedes Bangladeshi economist and public policy analyst Debapriya Bhattacharya, “expanding from trade and investment to multimodal connectivity, safety, security, and defense collaboration across various areas. However, Bangladeshis have largely perceived this relationship as an unbalanced and uneven exchange. There are unresolved issues, such as border killings, the border itself, the water-sharing problem, and the growing trade deficit.”
He says that despite Bangladesh “offering railway, road, and water transits” to India, “it hasn’t gained reciprocal access to Nepal and Bhutan.”
“This has fostered a general sentiment that the relationship is unequal and skewed,” says Bhattacharya, “even though Bangladesh acknowledges India as the larger neighbor and recognizes the importance of a substantive and robust relationship.”
Remarks Bhattacharya: “Bangladesh seeks to develop a balanced relationship with its larger neighbors as well as with the global community. It is a small economy, but a very globalized economy. It understands that its future lies with the balanced global relationship, wholesome relationship with the neighbors as well.”
“Look at the case of India-Bangladesh relationship,” says the Bangladeshi analyst. “There was a time when we were very comfortable with the Indian National Congress. It is a party with which we have fought the liberation war. So, we were very comfortable with that. There were various worries after Congress lost power, (and) Mr. Modi came in place. But see how we have adjusted. So, if Bangladesh has adjusted to the change of guards in Delhi, Delhi should also learn how to adjust to the change of guards in Dhaka.”
Time to reassess and recalibrate relations
Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh’s former prime minister, had used her friendship with her Indian counterpart to keep the relationship between their two nations on an even keel. But her sudden departure now has it on uncharted waters.
When Narendra Modi first took office as India’s prime minister a decade ago, he launched the “Neighborhood First” policy, which was aimed at enhancing relations and economic ties with South Asian neighbors.
Despite facing challenges such as border disputes, project delays, and the increasing influence of China, one clear success story emerged: Bangladesh, which under the leadership of then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, cultivated a particularly strong partnership with India.
Hasina’s close collaboration with Modi led to significant gains for both nations, showcasing the potential of Modi’s regional vision when supported by cooperative leadership. Some politicians even hailed India’s decision to help an ally in need.
As late as last Aug. 10, opposition lawmaker Shashi Tharoor remarked in an interview with NDTV: “If we had not helped her, it would have been a disgrace for India … nobody would have wanted to be our friend, if we had treated our friend badly. Hasina ji has had (good) relationships with all Indian leaders. She is a friend of India, and India is a friend of hers.”
That interview was done five days after Hasina was forced to resign, ending 15 years of uninterrupted rule. She and her sister fled to India, where she is still believed to be staying as a guest of Modi’s government.
Yet while Hasina’s relationship with Modi seems to remain solid, that between Bangladesh and India looks uncertain for now.
A defining feature of Sheikh Hasina’s rule was her strong alliance with India, particularly with Prime Minister Modi. As protests erupted against her regime, frustration also targeted Modi, seen as her key international backer. Many Bangladeshis believe Modi’s support was crucial to Hasina’s prolonged grip on power.
From an Indian perspective, there is concern that any new government in Bangladesh might reflect the view that India was too closely aligned with Hasina’s regime, says Harsh V. Pant, a professor under the Department of Defence Studies at King’s College London. Bangladesh may thus distance itself from India, potentially taking policy positions detrimental to bilateral relations.
But he also points out that since the current administration in Bangladesh is only an interim government, there is really no telling yet how Dhaka will be dealing with Delhi.
“So (an) interim government is not really an elected government,” Pant says. “Now, an interim government will take positions perhaps based on certain kinds of factors that prevail on the ground. But eventually, when you have elections, who comes to power, which parties, which party or coalition comes to power, who is the leader – I think that uncertainty will remain for a while in the system.”
Last Aug. 8, Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was sworn in as the head of Bangladesh’s interim government. Weeks later, details regarding matters such as how long the interim government will be in power and when new general elections will be held have yet to be spelled out.
Pant believes that the interim government’s main focus right now is on bringing the state machinery back on track. This is even as Yunus’s effectiveness as leader of a nation that has just undergone a major political shock – and now coping as well with the aftermath of widespread flooding – remains to be seen.
Rollercoaster relations
For sure, relations between India and Bangladesh have had their ups and downs, shaped by shared history and geography. After India helped Bangladesh gain independence in 1971, the two countries enjoyed strong ties, particularly under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
But after Rahman’s assassination in 1975, the relationship cooled, especially during military rule and Khaleda Zia’s leadership, with tensions over border issues, water sharing, and security.
Still, despite challenges, cultural and trade connections remained between the two countries, though these were often complicated by trade imbalances and unresolved disputes. When Sheikh Hasina became prime minister in 1996 and again in 2009, relations improved significantly, and especially under Modi’s tenure.
For many Bangladeshis, however, the relationship has been hardly a fair or a balanced one.
“It [India-Bangladesh relationship] has become multifaceted,” concedes Bangladeshi economist and public policy analyst Debapriya Bhattacharya, “expanding from trade and investment to multimodal connectivity, safety, security, and defense collaboration across various areas. However, Bangladeshis have largely perceived this relationship as an unbalanced and uneven exchange. There are unresolved issues, such as border killings, the border itself, the water-sharing problem, and the growing trade deficit.”
He says that despite Bangladesh “offering railway, road, and water transits” to India, “it hasn’t gained reciprocal access to Nepal and Bhutan.”
“This has fostered a general sentiment that the relationship is unequal and skewed,” says Bhattacharya, “even though Bangladesh acknowledges India as the larger neighbor and recognizes the importance of a substantive and robust relationship.”
In addition, religion has been complicating Bangladesh-India relations. Even before Hasina’s downfall, rising Hindu nationalism in India, marked by anti-Muslim and anti-Bangladesh rhetoric, had elicited a reciprocal response in Bangladesh. Modi’s visit to Bangladesh in March 2021, for example, sparked protests that led to at least 12 getting killed.
Since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina-led government, members of minority communities in Bangladesh have faced at least 205 attacks across 52 districts, according to the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council and the Bangladesh Puja Udjapan Parishad.
Pant warns that if this issue is not addressed swiftly, it could have a spillover effect into policy and public discourse.
“Although Hindus have faced significant marginalization in Bangladesh since independence,” he says, “they have largely managed to coexist. However, if there is a rise in Islamist extremism in Bangladesh, it will likely be amplified in India. This amplification could have serious consequences for the bilateral relationship between the two countries.”
Assurances from Dhaka
Bangladesh’s interim government understands this well. Among Yunus’s first official acts as Chief Advisor was a phone call to Modi, assuring him that Hindus in Bangladesh would be protected, as well as emphasizing that reports of violence were largely exaggerated.
A BBC Verify investigation has supported this latter assertion, revealing that Hindutva voices in the Indian media and on social media had amplified the situation.
Meanwhile, Bangladeshi students – who were at the forefront of the protests that led to Hasina’s departure – believe that the disinformation and misinformation originating from across the border are only deepening distrust among their people toward India.
“We don’t hate Indian people,” says Zareef Faiaz Monjur, a 20-year-old Dhaka University student. “We think of them as our brothers. But the Indian media, particularly the propaganda, has been problematic. While we acknowledge that there has been some violence in various areas, the spread of fake news has been a significant issue. For example, a video of a house burning in Bengaluru, recorded in 2021, was falsely circulated as a Bangladeshi Hindu house being burned.”
India’s former foreign secretary, Harshvardan Shringla, also touched on religious matters at a recent event where a report on policy options for India in dealing with Bangladesh’s current situation was released.
Shringla, who was once India’s ambassador to Bangladesh, emphasized the importance of engaging with the current leadership in Bangladesh, noting that instability there directly affects the security situation in India’s northeastern region.
He also highlighted two key concerns: ensuring that Bangladesh’s territory is not used in any way that could harm India’s interests and safeguarding the safety of Hindus and other minority communities in the neighboring country.
At the very least, it helps that Yunus, an economist who founded the microlender Grameen Bank, is not only popular and respected in Bangladesh, but also highly regarded in India and elsewhere.
“I would strongly expect…a summit level meeting (between India and Bangladesh) at an early date,” says Bhattacharya.
In the meantime, Bangladesh’s interim government is already making moves to assure the international community of its goodwill to everyone.
In a statement, interim government Foreign Affairs Advisor Md Touhid Hossain said that Bangladesh aims to “maintain good relations with all and enmity with none.” He further emphasized that the interim government’s approach to international relations is grounded in balanced diplomacy.
“It is meaningless to assume that this interim government is focused solely on any particular direction,” Hossain said. “We intend to maintain smooth and positive relations with all … including India and China.”
Remarks Bhattacharya: “Bangladesh seeks to develop a balanced relationship with its larger neighbors as well as with the global community. It is a small economy, but a very globalized economy. It understands that its future lies with the balanced global relationship, wholesome relationship with the neighbors as well.”
Pant, for his part, stresses the need for India to do extensive outreach with all its stakeholders in Bangladesh. Bhattacharya echoes this, adding that bilateral relations cannot remain aligned to a single political party.
“Look at the case of India-Bangladesh relationship,” says the Bangladeshi analyst. “There was a time when we were very comfortable with the Indian National Congress. It is a party with which we have fought the liberation war. So, we were very comfortable with that. There were various worries after Congress lost power, (and) Mr. Modi came in place. But see how we have adjusted. So, if Bangladesh has adjusted to the change of guards in Delhi, Delhi should also learn how to adjust to the change of guards in Dhaka.”