Originally posted in The Daily Star on 26 September 2025
Following the ouster of the Awami League government in August 2024, the interim government established a number of reform commissions with a key focus being on remaking the political system. Bicameralism, proportional representation, and non-partisan constitutional appointments were among the formal recommendations. However, whether these prescriptions can pierce the entrenched dominance of the executive or disrupt the winner-takes-all culture of Bangladesh’s politics remains a question. This article discusses whether creating an upper house in parliament would ensure accountability of the majority party or, in other words, whether it would create checks and balances in legislative, executive, and judicial processes.
Creating a second chamber in parliament to diffuse power, introducing proportional representation to prevent winner-takes-all outcomes, and establishing non-partisan appointment mechanisms to strengthen oversight are largely visionary proposals. Since institutions are mostly politically captured, bicameralism risks becoming a vehicle to reward party loyalists rather than enhance accountability, as it expands offices and seats without curbing entranced executive dominance. Without mechanisms for independent oversight and enforcement, the proposals, even if accepted, offer limited potential to improve parliamentary scrutiny or restrain majoritarian excesses.
Bangladesh faces a complex political reality in which polarised politics and a dominant majority party undermine the independence of the legislature, while opposition participation remains inconsistent due to boycotts and structural barriers. Although committees and procedural checks exist, they still lack the capacity and enforcement power to function effectively. In this context, bicameralism or proportional representation are unlikely to succeed without independent enforcement mechanisms.
Therefore, Bangladesh needs an out-of-the-box solution to ensure sustainable accountability practices given the prevailing political reality. The Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) has recently conducted a study on parliamentary reform and proposed an independent parliamentary commission for democracy, legislative, executive, and legal affairs. Unlike ad hoc reforms, this would stand alongside parliament as an impartial watchdog, offering expertise, scrutiny, and balance where political actors themselves refuse to do so.
Establishing a commission for oversight
The Jatiya Sangsad, in principle, holds extensive powers over legislation, finance, and oversight. In practice, these powers are heavily curtailed by majority-party dominance. Parliamentary committee leadership is mostly partisan, proceedings are hurried, and opposition MPs face systemic barriers. Budgetary oversight is superficial. Audits are delayed, and recommendations ignored. Even procedural reforms, such as referring bills to committees after the first reading, have not been translated into substantial scrutiny. Parliament is structurally incapable of holding the majority party accountable.
A dedicated commission may give parliament the oversight it lacks. It could review bills before introduction to ensure they follow the constitution, serve public interests, and respect democratic principles. It could also monitor laws after they are passed, identify gaps, and suggest corrections. Committees would gain research and advice to strengthen scrutiny. Budget oversight would become meaningful, as financial committees gain the tools to spot irregularities and demand transparency. Most importantly, by promoting pluralism, the parliamentary commission could encourage opposition participation, reduce boycotts and walkouts, and push for genuine cross-party cooperation. Without such a body, accountability would remain mostly a promise.
Unlike bicameralism, this commission would be designed to operate independently, with a clear mandate, structural safeguards, and functional authority. It would consist of independent experts selected for their knowledge of law, political science, public administration, and democratic governance, ensuring that technical competence drives decision-making rather than political allegiance. Appointments would follow a transparent, multiparty process to safeguard neutrality, while members would serve fixed, non-renewable terms to insulate them from partisan pressures. These experts can analyse legislation, monitor executive actions, and evaluate parliamentary practices objectively, translating complex data into actionable recommendations.
The commission’s operational independence would be reinforced through financial autonomy. It would be provided with a separate budget free from executive manipulation, and through transparent reporting, its findings would be made public to enable citizen oversight and media scrutiny. Additionally, consultative engagement with civil society, academic experts, and the private sector would ensure any recommendations are grounded in empirical realities, while a dedicated secretariat would support research, documentation, and coordination, allowing commissioners to focus on substantive evaluation. This structure positions the commission not merely as an advisory entity but as a credible oversight institution where expert neutrality and evidence-based analysis can influence parliamentary practice and curb executive overreach.
A case study from Europe
The CPD proposes taking lessons from the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, also called the European Commission for Democracy through Law. It was established in 1990 to strengthen democratic institutions, promote the rule of law, and support member states in upholding constitutional norms. Its success rests on three pillars: independence, expertise, and functional flexibility. Members are experts in law, political science, and human rights, serving in a personal capacity rather than as political appointees, thus ensuring impartiality.
The commission provides pre-legislative reviews, advises on constitutional amendments, drafts guidelines, evaluates the functioning of democratic institutions, and supports citizen participation in governance. Its opinions cover legislative, constitutional, and administrative matters.
It holds four plenary sessions per year, appoints rapporteurs for country-specific opinions, and engages with governmental bodies, civil society, and academic experts. Reports are confidential until adopted, ensuring candid evaluation, and once finalised, they are published to maintain transparency. A secretariat supports its operations, providing technical assistance, drafting documents, and facilitating research.
Over decades, the Venice Commission has thus become a trusted arbiter of democratic reform, mediating political disputes, strengthening parliamentary procedures, and promoting judicial and institutional independence across Europe and beyond.
The lesson for Bangladesh is clear: combine structural independence, technical capacity, and impartial authority for real accountability. Without these, parliament remains a symbolic body, incapable of challenging the executive, scrutinising legislation, or enforcing transparency.
An independent commission, as the CPD proposes, could address the root problem: it could inject impartial expertise, pre-legislative and post-legislative scrutiny, and technical capacity into the system. It could strengthen the architecture of accountability itself. With independence, expertise, structural safeguards, and operational capacity, it could provide the much-needed oversight.
If Bangladesh is serious about ensuring accountability of the majority party, strengthening parliamentary scrutiny, and safeguarding democratic legitimacy, it cannot rely on symbolic reforms or additional chambers alone. It must build institutions capable of functioning independently, impartially, and effectively. Without such a commission, the promise of accountability will remain aspirational, and the cycle of fragile parliamentary governance will continue. Finally, Bangladesh needs an independent mechanism that can hold the majority party accountable, not just another chamber in parliament. Anything less will be political theatre, not democracy.
Dr Khondaker Golam Moazzem is research director at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD). Rukaiya Islam is programme associate (research) at the CPD. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.
