Originally posted in The Business Standard on 27 March 2026
In Bangladesh, where no provision exists to use referendums for constitutional restructuring, elevating them as a decisive reference point introduces ambiguity and risks bypassing established amendment procedures
Since all elected members of the National Parliament took oath on 17 February 2026, but only members of the opposition took oath as members of the Constitutional Reform Council, its fate has been in limbo.
The council is the main focus of the July Charter (Constitutional Amendment) Order, 2025. However, it is not part of the July Charter, which was signed by the major political parties taking part in the discussion under the Constitution Reform Committee.
The idea of the reform council has been further reinforced by the inclusion of the implementation of the July Charter (Constitution) Order in the Referendum Ordinance. As the authors discussed in an earlier article, the referendum was identified as problematic given its faulty structure of seeking people’s verdict (a total of 122 issues/questions were packaged in one reply), the inclusion of constitutional matters in the referendum through an ordinance without having prior approval of the National parliament and so on.
Now the whole debate regarding the legality of the ‘Constitution Reform Council’ has been rounded up on two major grounds: (a) What is the legal status of ‘referendum’ and the verdict that has come out through the referendum? and (b) Is the ‘Constitution Reform Council’ necessary in implementing the July Charter?
A Referendum cannot serve as a point of reference for constitutional reform
The growing demand to treat referendums as a basis for constitutional reform, particularly in relation to proposals such as a constitution reform council — reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of constitutional hierarchy.
Under the Constitution of Bangladesh, legal authority flows through defined institutions and procedures, most importantly through parliament and the formal amendment process. A referendum, by contrast, has no independent legal standing unless it is explicitly recognised within the constitutional framework.
Therefore, using a referendum to legitimise a reform council without prior constitutional amendment reverses the established order: it places political demand before constitutional authorisation. This creates a parallel source of legitimacy that operates outside the Constitution and lacks both legal certainty and institutional accountability.
From a governance standpoint, this approach is institutionally unsustainable. Constitutional reform is not merely a reflection of majority preference at a given moment; it is a structured process that requires deliberation, checks and balances, and legal clarity.
Comparative practice shows that referendums function as supplementary tools within constitutional systems, not as mechanisms that override them. In Bangladesh, where no provision exists to use referendums for constitutional restructuring, elevating them as a decisive reference point introduces ambiguity and risks bypassing established amendment procedures.
If such a precedent is normalised, it would weaken constitutional supremacy and open the door for future attempts to pursue extra-constitutional reforms based on transient political majorities. Rather than strengthening democratic legitimacy, this would fragment the institutional order and undermine the stability that constitutional governance is designed to ensure.
A Constitution Reform Council is not necessary for implementing the July Charter
Several important issues require an in-depth review of the July Charter (Constitutional Amendment) Order. These include the following: (a) Whether the president can issue such an order when the parliament is not in session? (b) Whether all the articles of this order are constitutional or whether any article is unconstitutional? (c) If any article is unconstitutional, is there a scope for forming a Constitutional Reform Council under this order without amending it? (d) If there is a rationale for amending the order, is there a logical basis for a referendum held on the basis of the unamended order? and (e) Whether it was possible to undertake the constitutional reform issues within the existing constitutional framework?
During the first session, 133 ordinances and orders passed during the interim government have been presented in the National Parliament for approval. This includes the July National Charter (Constitutional Amendment) Order, which highlights the formation, operation and dissolution of the Constitution Reform Council.
As per the order, the council will take initiatives to reform the constitution on specific issues by forming the Constitutional Reform Council. These ordinances and orders are required to be tabled in the form of bills and approved by the parliament within 30 days (not working days). Otherwise, these orders or ordinances will automatically be cancelled. However, there will be an opportunity to place these ordinances in the form of bills again in the parliament.
According to Article 93 of the Constitution, the president has the power to issue ordinances if the parliament is dissolved or if the parliament is not in session. However, those ordinances, according to Article 93, cannot in any way derogate from the existing Constitution; cannot in any way change or repeal any article of the Constitution; or cannot be for the purpose of maintaining the continuity of any ordinance passed earlier.
Two things are clear from this: (a) The president has not been given the authority to issue anything other than an ordinance, (b) Since the issuance of a presidential ordinance regarding constitutional amendments is unconstitutional, meaning the president cannot issue it through any other means either. Considering these points, there is no further scope for discussion of the July Charter (Constitution Amendment) Order, which could be naturally nullified.
In an article published earlier in the Daily Samakal (3 February 2026), one of the authors of this article explained why several articles of the order related to the Constitutional Reform Council are ‘unconstitutional’.
These include — First, the ‘decision taken by a majority vote of the total members of the Council to approve any proposal relating to constitutional reform’ as described in Article 10(3) conflicts with the requirement of a two-thirds vote of the members of parliament for passing a bill relating to the constitution as per Article 142 of the Constitution.
Second, Article 14 of the order is also unconstitutional, as it states that “any constitutional reform adopted by the council shall be considered final and no other form of approval or consent will be required regarding such reform”. This council has the authority to approve any constitutional amendment if it proposes a necessary amendment to the National Parliament.
In that case, the National Parliament will initiate the necessary process of approval, starting from bills. Apart from this, in the article related to the operation of the Constitutional Reform Council of the order, the issue of the ‘Chairman’ or ‘Deputy Chairman’ elected with the consent of the majority of members to operate the Constitutional Reform Council as per the July Charter (Constitutional Reform) Implementation Order, is also unconstitutional.
Decision-making on important constitutional matters is not supposed to fall under the purview of this council, which should only be in light of decisions taken by the full bench under the supervision of the Speaker of the main National Assembly.
Even if the discussion is held by electing the ‘Speaker’ as the ‘Chairman’ or the ‘Deputy Speaker’ as the ‘Deputy Speaker’, there is no scope to avoid the process of raising and approving bills related to the constitution in the main session of the parliament.
Apart from this, according to Article-7, ‘the Council shall amend the constitution within 180 working days of the commencement of the first session in accordance with the July Charter and the results of the referendum and after completing it, the activities of the Council shall be completed’, it is not a parliamentary custom to set a time limit.
According to the existing constitution, after any bill is raised in the parliament, it is discussed on the floor and, if necessary, sent for the opinion of the parliamentary standing committee and after discussion there, it is raised in the parliament for approval. In this process, a lot of time is required for a bill to be converted into a law in the parliament. On the other hand, if the reform orders and referendum issues are taken into account, a large number of issues will need to be decided, which is time-consuming.
Apart from this, there are many issues with ‘notes of dissent’ from political parties, which have been included as an article in this order. Especially, the ruling party has ‘notes of dissent’ on several issues related to the upper house.
There is a ‘note of dissent’ on the process of electing members of the upper house in the ‘PR’ system inserted in the referendum. Hence, these issues will be debated and if they are accepted, then the Order needs to be amended.
At the beginning of the functioning of the Constitution Reform Council, time will be spent on determining its rules of procedure (RoP). According to Article 7(3), the Reform Council is responsible for determining the procedures. Amending the Constitution Reform Order and determining the rules of procedure of the Constitution Reform Council and examining the matter by the Ministry of Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs is time-consuming. Therefore, setting a time limit of 180 days is both unconstitutional and unrealistic.
At the same time, the MPs are not constitutionally allowed to take oath as members of the ‘Constitutional Reform Council’ as the issue of the Council is unconstitutional as per Schedule-2 of Article 8.
Despite all these weaknesses, it was not right to include the July Charter (Constitutional Amendment) Order in the referendum. In my article on February 3 on the various weaknesses of the referendum, I had indicated that the interim government’s decision on the referendum was flawed and imposed on the people and on the political parties.
At the same time, asking the people to vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on 122 issues or questions through just one question does not give any legitimacy to the referendum result. As a result, even though the referendum result is a ‘yes’ vote, its basis remains very weak.
The interim government’s Constitution Amendment Committee, under pressure from various political parties, has made the issue of initiating the amendment of the constitution a mere trifle while giving the July Charter a ‘legal basis’.
The question is, was it not possible to reform in the light of the July Charter in the existing constitutional framework without the Constitutional Reform Council? The answer is ‘Yes’, it was possible and still is.
In light of the existing constitution, the current parliament can raise the issues adopted in the July Charter in the form of bills and turn them into laws with the support of a two-thirds majority of the members.
In addition to raising these bills as government bills, there is an opportunity to raise them as private bills. If the government party does not raise any bill to amend the constitution of the July Charter, the opposition members can raise it in the parliament as private members’ bills. Even members of the ruling parties or their alliances may do the same before raising private members’ bills.
It is not that the interim government’s Constitutional Reform Committee is unaware of these weaknesses. Even in expert-level discussions, there were opinions for and against it. Even after knowing this, there may have been other political considerations in issuing the July Charter (Constitutional Reform) Order and incorporating the Constitutional Reform Council into it and incorporating it in the referendum, which is not positive for constitutional continuity.
In the current context, the ‘July Charter (Constitutional Amendment) Order’ is not constitutional. However, in the coming days, the issues of amending the constitution in the constitutional framework in the light of the July Charter can be raised in the form of bills and after reviewing them in the parliamentary standing committee, they can be raised in the parliament.
In this way, it is open for the MPs (ruling party and the opposition) to raise the constitutional amendment-related issues in the form of bills one after another throughout the entire term of the current parliament. For this, there is no need to form a Constitution Reform Council.
Dr Khondaker Golam Moazzem, Research Director, and Rukaiya Islam, Research Associate. Both are working on the CPD parliamentary Studies. This is an English translation of the authors’ article published in the Daily Samakal on 15 March 2026.
