Published in Dhaka Tribune on Wednesday, 25 March 2015.
March 1971 Diary (Part 17)
Rehman Sobhan
This extract is the final part of Rehman Sobhan’s contemporaneous account of the events of that momentous month in Bangladeshi history. This was first published in the final issue of Forum on March 20, 1971. The Forum offices were closed and the magazine shut down by the Pakistan army on March 26
The totally unprecedented resistance to this move within Bangla Desh has led to the inevitable reaction within West Pakistan. Whilst many political figures in the West began by supporting the postponement, by the end of the second week of people’s Raj in Bangla Desh, all bar the PPP were demanding that Yahya concede Mujib’s Four Points in toto.
Bhutto, who remained apologetic and on the defensive ever since March 1, was thus compelled to further expose his ambition in Karachi on March 14. Here he introduced West Pakistan for the first time to the concept of the two-nation theory and demanded that power be handed to the two majority parties of Pakistan, namely the Awami League in Bangla Desh and People’s Party in West Pakistan.
Bhutto’s drive towards becoming shahinshah of West Pakistan had of course been exposed in the columns of Forum some time ago, though none would have thought that he would be crass enough to proclaim his ambition at such a psychologically unfavourable moment. Needless to say the reaction in the two regions, NWFP and Baluchistan, where his writ does not run, was the most unfavourable. To them this was a clear attempt to reimpose Punjabi domination on them through the agency of Mr. Bhutto.
Even within the PPP there were serious misgivings not only at Mr. Bhutto’s present posture but his entire strategy. Whatever their misgivings about Six Points, they must have awakened to the fact that the price of resisting Six Points and also imposing their will on the Baluch and Pathan was a permanent partnership with the likes of General Omar. Far from PPP being the champion of democracy in West Pakistan, they would merely degenerate into the civilian front of another junta.
Whilst the events of last month have exposed Mr. Bhutto for what he is and perhaps in the process inflicted serious damage to the progressive cause in West Pakistan, it is not certain whether the wings of the hawks have at all been clipped.
Whilst no man of whatever persuasion in West Pakistan could now doubt the Himalayan blunder implicit in the act of postponement and fail to be aware of the near fatal damage to the concept of national unity, it is yet to be seen whether the right lessons will be drawn from the experience.
A sensible general as much as a sensible leader having miscalculated would attempt to recoup his losses by trying to come to terms with the people’s representatives in Bangla Desh and handing over power to them in order to create an atmosphere where the future of the country can be examined soberly.
On the other hand, both generals and leaders have also been known to compound their own blunders, thereby converting simple folly into unmitigated disaster.
Published in Dhaka Tribune on Tuesday, 24 March 2015.
March 1971 Diary (Part 16)
Rehman Sobhan
This extract is the penultimate part of a series that concludes on March 25, in which we reproduce Rehman Sobhan’s contemporaneous account of the events of that momentous month in Bangladeshi history. This was first published in Forum on March 20, 1971
The second miscalculation carne from the belief that Mujib would not gain sufficient command of the situation to bring the law and order situation under his control so quickly, so that even the excuse of wanton loot and mayhem, which was serving as a fig leaf for Operation Genocide, was not available to them.
Yahya’s report of loot and murder as the justification for killings had by March 6 ceased to bear any relation to reality. The calm which prevails in Dacca since his arrival is evidence enough of Mujib’s authority.
Within West Pakistan itself the front began to crumble. Chairman Bhutto had been assigned the role of rousing the masses against Bangladesh. He went around circulating the totally tendentious canard that Six Points meant the perpetual domination of West Pakistan by Bengalis when in fact it meant a repudiation of this very principle.
In this task it was expected that Mr. Bhutto would use his control over the masses to intimidate other parties in West Pakistan into boycotting the Assembly so that confrontation would be total.
Bhutto’s task had temporary success, but by the end of February the attempt was facing disaster and the only party which had joined the boycott was the Qayyum Muslim League. This party had all along been receiving support or patronage from a certain section of the administration who now pressured them into lining up with Bhutto.
It is well known that Rizvi, director of Central Intelligence, had openly persuaded prominent figures to join the QML, and that Major General Omar was also soliciting support for this party in the election along with Nawab Qizalbash.
Rizvi and Omar along with Major General Akber, the Service Intelligence chief, appear to have switched their support to Bliutto after the QML’s debacle, and there is evidence that Omar actually canvassed MNAs outside the PPP and QML against attending the Assembly.
When even three members of the QML booked their seats for Dacca and Bhutto faced the threat that more than half of his Sindhi MNAs and some from Punjab would also take the flight, the Omar-Akber axis, buttressed by Bhutto’s new adviser and intimate, MM Ahmed, had to intervene.
They seem to have mounted sufficient pressure to bail Bhutto out by having the Assembly session postponed.
It is not certain if the additional time was desired to firm up the crumbling West Wing front behind Bhutto to ensure a total confrontation with Bangla Desh or whether they wanted to sabotage the entire attempt to restore democracy.
Published in Dhaka Tribune on Monday, 23 March 2015.
March 1971 Diary (Part 15)
Rehman Sobhan
This extract is part of a series that will run until March 25, in which we reproduce Rehman Sobhan’s contemporaneous account of the events of that momentous month in Bangladeshi history. This was first published in Forum on March 20, 1971
All this is not to suggest that this extraordinary metamorphosis of the movement from non-cooperation to people’s raj was not causing some problems.
The banking system began to acquire a lopsided appearance as local banks gained deposits at the expense of non-local banks. Their principals, in turn, in Karachi, seemed to be reluctant to respond to their local office’s calls for transfer of funds, so that the local State Bank was forced into the role of lender of the last resort to non-local banks to enable them to meet the run on their deposits.
The phenomenon was one of neurosis without any immediate foundation in fact, and corrective measures were being supplied through call lending by the local banks to those who were facing a run. Thus, the possibly inspired fear that non-local banks would close their doors did not have any real basis at all.
Once this awareness sinks in there is some prospect of a restoration of normalcy within the banking system notwithstanding motivated attempts to build up emotions in favour of local banks.
On the industrial front, however, uncertainties kept production low and lowered efficiency. This again reflected the contradictions between non-cooperation and people’s raj. Party exhortations to now resume work with redoubled vigour for the cause of Bangla Desh had as yet not got through to the work floor.
Apart from the absence of any operational machinery to translate party directives into specifics, workers are sceptical about a system where the prosperity of Bangla Desh is coterminous with the prosperity of their factory owner.
Whilst this unique situation continued to pose new problems every day, the one certainty remained the irrevocable break-down of Islamabad’s authority over the affairs of Bangla Desh.
With each day and directive, this authority has receded, and today any attempt to restore it will appear to the people as being little different from a British effort to reoccupy the sub-continent.
In this context, the sole power of the Islamabad regime appears to be its capacity to inflict death on the people and to attempt to precipitate economic chaos as is evident by the diversion of food ships from Chittagong to Karachi.
The question may therefore well be asked as to why they find themselves in this untenable position where their only option to coming to terms with Sheikh Mujib’s demands is to unleash genocide.
The answer, as with most wars of aggression, appears to lie in miscalculation. Those who initiated confrontation by the postponement of the Assembly session believed that the public response would be small and localised and would succumb to a swift and effective application of force.
Mr. Bhutto is reported to have told visitors that such a form reaction to the agitation would soon bring the Awami League to their senses. No one dreamt that within 7 days not only would the people vigorously resist attempts at mass murder but would bring central authority to a complete standstill.
Perhaps no one even within the Awami League could have believed that non-cooperation could be so total as to place them in command of Bangla Desh within a week of their call for action.
Published in Dhaka Tribune on Sunday, 22 March 2015.
March 1971 Diary (Part 14)
Rehman Sobhan
This extract is part of a series that will run until March 25, in which we reproduce Rehman Sobhan’s contemporaneous account of the events of that momentous month in Bangladeshi history. This was first published in Forum on March 20, 1971
Talks with Sheikh Mujib commenced next morning at President’s House when Mujib, flanked by his bodyguards, but otherwise alone, drove into the lion’s den. The first talks lasted two and a half hours. They met again the next morning for an hour.
What has come out of the talks awaits revelation, but some optimism derived from the fact that they went on for several days and that a legal expert rather than an artillery expert had been sent for. This did not however suppress much anxious speculation in the province which included the untrue rumour that Mujib had walked out of his first meeting in a great rage.
Indeed, the barometer in Dacca continued to fluctuate, with the nervous middle class moving to the villages in order to get out of the way of a possible shooting war and the militants keeping up the tempo with local drilling and other more meaningful preparations.
In this period the economy continued to remain precariously poised between standstill and revival. A consolidated decree of regulations issued by the Awami League on March 15 carried on the task of selective revival of the administration and full revival of the economy.
The assertion of control over Bangla Desh was carried a step further by extending the no-tax campaign into one of collecting taxes for the “Government of Bangla Desh.”
All central provincial and local taxes were designated for payment into special accounts to be opened by the only two Bbanks with their headquarters in Bangla Desh, and the State Bank of Pakistan and Treasury remained immobilised. Pending export bills were also designated to these two banks for negotiation.
State Bank and all commercial banks continued to function at the direction of the Awami League. This did not prevent the run on banks from continuing but there were some signs of the situation improving as more relaxation on the controls over banks was permitted.
Published in Dhaka Tribune on Saturday, 21 March 2015.
March 1971 Diary (Part 13)
Rehman Sobhan
This extract is part of a series that will run until March 25, in which we reproduce Rehman Sobhan’s contemporaneous account of the events of that momentous month in Bangladeshi history. This was first published in Forum on March 20, 1971
The movement for Bangla Desh is completing its third week. By now the transfer of power within Bangla Desh to the people’s representatives is total. The opposite side of the coin, non-cooperation with Islamabad, continues.
No civilian official went to receive the president on his arrival. MLR directives to civilian employees of the security forces to join work on March 15 were ignored in spite of the contingent hazard of 10 years’ RI, and workers donated a day’s salary to the Awami League Relief Fund. Eleven thousand civilian employees of the ordnance factory at Joydebpur joined them in a boycott of work.
The population continues its refusal to provision security forces and the quarter master general of the army has had to personally fly into Dacca to examine the supply position and make alternative arrangements, which, it is reported, included the flying of tinned provisions from West Pakistan by giant C-130 transport planes.
On the other hand, the military build-up goes on. Additional troops have been flown in though it is not certain if the N5C cargo of 7,500 auxiliaries have as yet disembarked at Chittagong. From Comilla the SSG commando unit has reportedly been brought into Dacca and tanks designed for securing our borders have been brought down to Dacca from Rangpur.
It was in this atmosphere that Yahya flew into Dacca unannounced at 2:30pm on March 15. In fact, All India Radio announced the news of his departure for Dacca before Radio Pakistan.
His arrival however was hardly secret, since a massive contingent of police, EPR and army lined the airport to President’s House and provided him with an escort of exceptional ferocity.
It is not clear precisely what all this was about but Yahya’s drive was greeted only with stony silence and the still black flags which bedecked his route.
There was much speculation about his entourage and some suggestion that the entire war cabinet including Generals Hamid and Gul Hassan had accompanied the president.
It is confirmed that he was accompanied by Lt. Generals Peerzada, principal staff officer to the president, and Ornar, security boss of the services, though ex-Law Minister Justice Cornelius flew in on March 17 in his new capacity as legal adviser to the president.
In fact, the chief of Inter Services Public Relations, Brig. Siddiqui, was at great pains to impress newsmen that there was no special complement of generals accompanying the president, though this did not put speculation at rest that Hamid and Gul Hassan were holed out in the cantonment keeping a watching brief on the talks.
Published in Dhaka Tribune on Friday, 20 March 2015.
March 1971 Diary (Part 12)
Rehman Sobhan
This extract is part of a series that will run until March 25, in which we reproduce Rehman Sobhan’s contemporaneous account of the events of that momentous month in Bangladeshi history. This was first published in Forum on March 13, 1971
In this context, all attention is directed to Yahya who is expected any day. Lt. General Yakub left Dacca on 9th and was replaced by the governor designate Lt. General Tikka Khan. It is reported that Yakub had no stomach for killing people whose language he learnt and culture he admired, in support of a lost cause. The security forces were apparently staying within barracks avoiding confrontation. Indications are that they are marking time for Yahya’s arrival.
And what does this promise? Yahya’s strategy over the last week indicates the use of the carrot and the stick. Whilst the tone of his broadcast on the 6th was designed to give maximum offence to Bangla Desh, in substance, the declaration of a date for the assembly, without preconditions, was a climb down. But then his reference to LFO and his dispatch of a reputed hawk to replace Yakub indicated the brandishing of a big stick. But again Tikka Khan has shown relative restraint since his arrival.
Now we find the great Chairman Bhutto shedding a few crocodile tears for his dead victims and talking the language of conciliation in his cable to the Sheikh.
The wellsprings of bitterness and frustration generated by recent events invoke only suspicion within the people. Many see this as a gesture to buy time before the final showdown. This is envisaged as taking place when Yahya vetoes a Six-Points based constitution. By this time sufficient reinforcements will be at hand to cope with all eventualities.
But another school sees Yahya corning to terms with reality in Bangla Desh. For effective power is now irrevocably out of the hands of Islamabad and any attempt to re-establish it will require the reconquest of the whole province piece by piece. Nor can they expect people to merely play the role of live targets for the movement has advanced, light years between March 1 and 10.
In this situation Yahya may well cede Mujib’s demands de facto. He will let him continue to exercise power in Bangla Desh, he will keep his troops in the barracks, he will, in effect, end martial law by the simple expedient of not enforcing it. This will then be presented as an exercise in restraint and good faith which should be sufficient to let Mujib come to the National Assembly.
Mujib would then have to decide whether demand for de jure rather than de facto power was sufficient to precipitate confrontation or whether he should go ahead and join the constitutional debate whilst consolidating his hold on Bangla Desh.
He must have realised by now that in any system controlled from Islamabad, provincial power has limited attractions. He has no control of domestic revenues, foreign exchange, or aid. He will also face the risk of veto once he passes his draft unless Yahya has realised that Six Points is the best of all evils he faces in his confrontation with Bangla Desh.
If Mujib can get Six Points carried he may possibly be able to contain his own hawks and keep the polity together. If however Yahya vetoes or Bhutto again sabotages the Assembly then Mujib will have no option but to seek a showdown on the streets.
With his middle-class base becoming progressively more irrelevant, he is becoming more dependent on the people to sustain his present confrontation and to lead any future movement. Here he will have to decide between leading their struggle in a full-fledged people’s war or making himself redundant in their next and final upsurge.
Published in Dhaka Tribune on Thursday, 19 March 2015.
March 1971 Diary (Part 11)
Rehman Sobhan
This extract is part of a series that will run until March 25, in which we reproduce Rehman Sobhan’s contemporaneous account of the events of that momentous month in Bangladeshi history. This was first published in Forum on March 13, 1971
The movement has in effect released untold resources from within the people. Today, in law, there is no government in Bangladesh nor the sanctions which go with it.
The limited decisions and authority exercised by the Awami League are not enforceable in any court of law nor is there any effective machinery to put their decisions into effect.
If they pass a decree prohibiting private banks from remitting money out of Bangladesh or withdrawals for unauthorized purposes there is none to enforce it for them.
This extraordinary set up is thus predicated on the unstinted loyalty and co-operation of the common man with the people’s representatives. We have seen how in offices it is the clerks and lower division worker who act as custodians of the public interest.
Outside, in spite of some initial anarchy which found expression in loot and communal vandalism, normalcy has returned. Even the escaped convicts seem to be acting with patriotism and restraint. Police report an actual decline in the crime rate from normal times.
Today they collaborate with the green capped Awami League volunteers to police the towns not just against a recrudescence of violence but generally to ensure law and order.
In Gulshan and Dhanmondi, where middle-class nerves are particularly on edge, volunteers have been visiting houses and making their presence felt.
This is not to say that some peaceful nirvana has descended upon Bangla Desh either. It is reported that chemicals for explosives have been taken away from the Dacca University Laboratories and the PCSIR laboratories by armed bands. Sentries of VIPs have been overpowered and their weapons seized. The other face of the struggle is going on and one can be sure that in any future upsurge violence will not be one-sided.
Militancy is reflected in the spontaneous acts of resistance against the security forces. Their own press note reported that supplies to their base areas in Sylhet and Jessore were interrupted. It took 18 hours for a supply convoy to get from Khulna to Jessore because of cuts in the road by peasants.
In Chittagong, M. V. Swat, carrying the first reinforcements from West Pakistan, had been partially unloaded into wagons. But workers, taking their own initiative, suspended unloading and removed the becalmed wagons.
All this reflects the spontaneous response of workers, peasants, and the common man to what they feel is a struggle for survival.
Published in Dhaka Tribune on Wednesday, 18 March 2015.
March 1971 Diary (Part 10)
Rehman Sobhan
This extract is part of a series that will run until March 25, in which we reproduce Rehman Sobhan’s contemporaneous account of the events of that momentous month in Bangladeshi history. This was first published in Forum on March 13, 1971
This however did not mean that all civil servants were sitting idle. They were carrying the struggle from its phase of non-cooperation to active cooperation with the Awami League. Groups of officials accepted the task of identifying problems and presenting them to Sheik Mujib for decision.
A sort of improvised Secretariat was in operation where streams of businessmen and civil servants were visiting in search of solutions to problems, consultation and reassurance. The conditions of work were difficult, but decisions were being made and in many cases more rapidly than within the Eden Buildings.
This left much to be desired in the organizational apparatus, conditions of work and modus operandi. The lack of experience of the decision-makers itself is a constraint. But work went on.
Today, as a result, writ of the people’s representatives covers the four corners of Bangladesh. Secretaries, deputy commissioners, circle officers, policemen, are all taking orders from them. Police operate in conjunction with the AL volunteers to enforce a degree of law and order which is unusual, considering the troubled times.
Local authorities in the mofussil have begun to collaborate with the Sangram Parishad (Resistance Committees) and take directives from them. Today, in fact, effective power and decision-making within the administration emanates from one source — the Awami League.
Whilst the collaboration of the administration provides a unique dimension to the present situation it is, in terms of effectiveness, far less significant than the response of the people. The sanctions on the senior administrators for instance are, in practice, being exercised by their own subordinates, the Class III and IV employees.
Their overzealousness in safeguarding any attempt to sabotage party decisions has occasionally paralysed those areas where administration has revived and sent officials weeping to Dhanmondi for assistance in imposing their own authority.
Effective power has now moved from the secretary to his subordinate and, even when normal lines of authority are restored, the relationship between the boss and his subordinate can never be the same again.
In private banks and offices again, as in factories, it is the workers who are safeguarding the interests of Bangla Desh from evasion and possible sabotage by the top executives.
Whilst many of these have collaborated, either out of a genuine sense of commitment or simple fear of their subordinates, some have attempted to use the relaxations permitted by the decree to secrete money out of the system.
That it is not much worse must owe to the patriotism and vigilance of their own employees.
Published in Dhaka Tribune on Tuesday, 17 March 2015.
1971 Diary (Part 9)
Rehman Sobhan
This extract is part of a series that will run until March 25, in which we reproduce Rehman Sobhan’s contemporaneous account of the events of that momentous month in Bangladeshi history. This was first published in Forum on March 13, 1971
Non-cooperation was however only a first step. Even more remarkable has been the evolution from non-cooperation with Islamabad to cooperation with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Whilst the Eden Building remains a mausoleum for lost hopes, administration has come to life on Road 32, Dhanmondi, the residence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
From March 4, policy statements designed to restore normalcy in the province began to emanate from Road 32. The first decrees permitted banks to re-open from March 5, between the hours of 2.30 and 4.30, where they were permitted to encash cheques to a limit of Rs.1,500.
The next day this was elaborated to permit encashment of cheques for payment of wages and salaries, but these required authentication by the trade union leader of the establishment. These steps were dictated by the fact that the common man was beginning to feel the pinch. The breaking of the crisis coincided with pay day in many factories and establishments and workers were faced with starvation unless they had some cash in hand.
The revival of banking has not been without problems. To begin with, there was a run on the banks for fear that banks may close again, rather than any threat of their imminent bankruptcy. In outlying districts, branches could not open because they had exhausted their cash reserves and could not replenish this from their head office in Dacca due to the breakdown of communications.
This has been partially normalized with improvements in the communications network. It is expected that very soon people’s preference for cash will decline and the run on the banks will be reversed. The operation of the banks for only 2 hours however restricted the activities of the banks and a further decree on March 8 enabled them to operate longer.
The decree permitted banks to also make disbursements for raw materials for the operation of factories, since the factories had been permitted to operate from March 5, but were put into difficulties because of banking restrictions.
All these measures were dictated by the need to revive the economy and mitigate any hardship for the workers. The main problem was however to restrict a run on the banks and a flight of capital from Bangladesh.
In the same way, the decree of March 9 permitted a selective revival of governmental activities. Parts of the state bank needed to serve the banks, were opened up. Farmers were feeling the pinch so that the Agricultural Development Corporation was opened to resume supply of fertilizer to farmers and operate power pumps to water the winter crop.
Jute and rice seed distribution was permitted. Movement of food-grains and operation of food godowns was also permitted as were operation of utilities and arterial transport. For the rest, the Eden Building, courts, and kutcheries remained closed.
Another and more elaborate decree of March 12 carried the principle of selective non-cooperation a stage further.
Published in Dhaka Tribune on Monday, 16 March 2015.
March 1971 Diary (Part 8)
Rehman Sobhan
This extract is part of a series that will run until March 25, in which we reproduce Rehman Sobhan’s contemporaneous account of the events of that momentous month in Bangladeshi history. This was first published in Forum on March 13, 1971
There are few precedents for what is going on in Bangla Desh today. In a matter of one week a de facto transfer of power from the Islamabad government to the people’s representatives has been effected.
This has not been achieved by any spectacular victory on the battle front or by foreign intervention, or a formal surrender of power by the rulers, but largely by peaceful means.
One says this in spite of the massive death toll in the last week because these deaths were at the cost of the people of Bangla Desh and the forces of oppression.
The unique feature of this condition springs from the fact that peaceful non-cooperation has been taken a stage beyond to active cooperation with the people’s representatives. In most freedom struggles non-cooperation was a vital element in the struggle. This was designed to paralyse the economy and administration and make life for the rulers untenable.
Such a move could not be sustained indefinitely because the ruling power could always depend on a class of collaborators from the ranks of the administration, business and property-owning classes.
These elements have made it possible for even the French to enforce their writ in Indo-China at the height of the resistance and even the Germans and Japanese to keep the society functioning during the period of occupation in Europe and South East Asia.
In the freedom struggle in India, the civil service, judges and other elements, were always available to keep the show on the road and the police force was there to enforce law and order at all times. Only very rarely were troops required and this too in support, rather than in substitution, of the local administration.
What is therefore unprecedented for Bangla Desh is the fact that non-cooperation with the rulers in Islamabad is total. For the last week, not a single element in the administration has been available to collaborate, from the chief justice of East Pakistan to the chief secretary. This has never happened to my knowledge in any other country, in contemporary history.
In the extraordinary case of Radio Pakistan, when the military arbitrarily suspended the broadcast of Sheikh Mujib’s speech at the Race Course, after having given prior permission, the staff simply closed shop and went horne.
This created a major crisis in the districts where the abrupt cancellation of an announced broadcast threatened to create a law and order situation as people suspected that Mujib had been arrested.
When this prospect was intimated to the military authorities, along with the fact that no news at all would henceforth be broadcast from any radio station in Bangla Desh, they agreed to let the news be broadcast on the 8th morning.
On such terms did the radio network here resume operations and continue to operate their own news bulletin from Dacca Betar Kendra, leaving Radio Laos from Karachi to tell us all about news in Laos and the Middle East — anywhere but about Bangla Desh.
Published in Dhaka Tribune on Sunday, 15 March 2015.
March 1971 Diary (Part 7)
Rehman Sobhan
This extract is the seventh in a series that will run until March 25, in which we reproduce Rehman Sobhan’s contemporaneous account of the events of that momentous month in Bangladeshi history. This was first published in Forum on March 6, 1971
The military capability is being reinforced and an attempt may be made to enforce authority on the renegade administrators whose allegiance is now pledged to the people. Sheikh Mujib’s response to Yahya’s challenge in his rally on March 7 has set the stage for another showdown.
Despite considerable pressure from his rank and file, Mujib has however managed to keep the door open for an amicable solution to the crisis. The public mood wants much more than a mere dialogue which threatens to be frustrated by the LFO, reiterated once again as a challenge by President Yahya. Mujib has thus put his own leadership to the test in deferring the holocaust which must follow the inevitable confrontation with the reinforced hawks.
In this he had to balance the urge for compromise by the middle-class elements already feeling the pinch from the hartals and fearful of the chaos to corne, against the student-proletarian base which now dominates the mood on the streets.
His speech was thus less than what the militants demanded from the dais but was no craven capitulation either. He succeeded in returning the challenge to President Yahya and placed the responsibility of genocide and national disintegration solely on those who wield power today.
His demand for an end to Martial Law, the withdrawal of troops and power to the people is no more than a request to come to terms with the de facto situation in Bangla Desh today. Killing, looting, and arson has stopped and the majority has shown itself fully capable of coping with the situation. What exists of the administration is already being run by the Awami League, all officials willingly take orders from them to see that the province does not degenerate into chaos.
To attempt to reverse this situation by attempts to recapture the administration under Martial Law can only bring the province to a state of total collapse. The capability of the regime therefore only extends to the point where they can shoot down unarmed civilians and impose a reign of terror. But they can never hope to get the economy and administration of this province functioning again without the people’s consent.
If they are therefore serious about their search for a viable solution to the nation’s future, the least they must do is to accept Sheikh Mujib’s terms. Whether this will be enough to convince the people that the nation can be held together will depend on whether the assembly will cede the minimum demands of the people or whether they are merely deferring a showdown.
As it stands, it is not certain if even Six-Points is saleable any longer in Bangla Desh. Mr. Bhutto is reported to have said he saw no difference between Six-Points and disintegration. He is now being given a practical demonstration that an entire new world lies beyond Six-Points and that the authors of Six-Points were ironically perhaps the last true integrationists left in Pakistan.
Today the nation can hang together only by the freely given consent of the people of Bangla Desh. The power of weapons is no more capable of ensuring the integrity of the country than it was in keeping India under the British or united.
Sheikh Mujib has recognised this point and risked his entire political life in buying time for a final answer. In this simple act he has shown that if the nation does break it will lie on the heads of those who pull the trigger.
Published in Dhaka Tribune on Saturday, 14 March 2015.
March 1971 Diary (Part 6)
Rehman Sobhan
This extract is the sixth in a series that will run until March 25, in which we reproduce Rehman Sobhan’s contemporaneous account of the events of that momentous month in Bangladeshi history. This was first published in Forum on March 6, 1971
President Yahya’s announcement of an RTC on March 10 appeared in this atmosphere to be almost surrealistic. It completely ignored the climate of opinion in the province which was hardly propitious for detached conversation with tribal maliks and the sole representatives of such pre-historic entities like the Jamaat and even the Convention Muslim League, not to mention Mr. Bhutto himself.
Mujib’s refusal to attend the RTC did not require much discussion. By this time the situation was becoming untenable for the regime as the authority of the administration ground to a halt and its influence extended only within the range of its guns.
Not only had the hartals brought the province to a standstill, but the administration itself began to join the people in the non-cooperation movement. Civil servants, judges, and other government officials were willingly staying away from work and actively pledging their loyalty to the people’s representatives.
This reached its climax when not even a judge could be found to administer the oath to the new governor, Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan, on his arrival.
The extent of unity behind Shekih Mujib and the degree of non-cooperation with the rulers is without parallel in the history of the freedom movement in this sub-continent and must be a sobering thought to the rulers.
Sobriety however takes time to have its impact. Meanwhile, the killings went on. Firing on unarmed workers in Tongi, on demonstrators in Jessore, Khulna and other outlying areas continued to add to the pantheon of martyrs.
Whilst some looting and communal disturbance went on, the security forces rarely got to the scene on time and it was left to Awami League volunteers to apprehend and attempt to restore loot to the owners.
By the third night their volunteers, at least in Dacca, had enforced a degree of law and order which had proved quite beyond the capability of the gun-toting military convoys who had formerly policed the city.
The withdrawal of the security forces from the centre of the city to strategic redoubts around the airport and cantonment was thus as much a reflection of reality on the ground as it was tribute to the sense of discipline of the people.
The gradual collapse of authority, along with the unanimous and resolute response of the people in support of their leaders and against the oppressors, was expected to invoke a rational response from the regime.
Instead, in his broadcast of March 6, which first surprised and then outraged the whole populace of Bangla Desh, Yahya attempted to blame the leaders of the people and attributed this uprising to the act of a handful of arsonists, vandals, and murderers.
The fact that the progenitor of the crisis, Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, got off scot free in this blanket indictment, indicated that his tactic of closing ranks with the ruling elite had paid off.
Bangla Desh’s demands were now confronted with the language of weapons as one of the reputedly most hawkish elements in the power elite was pulled in as governor to replace Admiral Ahsan who had refused to carry the responsibility for the consequences of the postponement any longer.
Published in Dhaka Tribune on Friday, 13 March 2015.
March 1971 Diary (Part 5)
Rehman Sobhan
This extract is the fifth in a series that will run until March 25, in which we reproduce Rehman Sobhan’s contemporaneous account of the events of that momentous month in Bangladeshi history. This was first published in Forum on March 6, 1971
On Wednesday March 3, the atmosphere was electric. The crowds were out, the barricades up in Dacca, as the whole of East Pakistan carne to a total standstill.
In Dacca news had spread that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman would address the meeting called that afternoon at Paltan Maidan by the Student League.
By 3pm Paltan overflowed. Most were armed and ready at a call to march into hell. This was the union of the middle class students, the working class of the industrial areas, and the shorbohara of the street and slums:
The mood was revolution. Gone was the comfortable middle class ambience of such meetings. This was the people in the raw and demanding action.
The preliminary speeches by the Student League leaders and Mannan went all the way in their demands, making Six-Points into a positively reactionary slogan. Sheikh Mujib, faced with this armed and militant crowd, was faced with his own moment of truth.
In a unique display of crowd management, which put his charisma to the supreme test, he lowered the temperature of the crowd. He stopped short of the demands voiced earlier and asked instead for a peaceful transfer to the elected representatives of the people following the withdrawal of Martial Law.
The mood was revolution. Gone was the comfortable middle class ambience of such meetings.
He guaranteed to enforce law and order if curfew was lifted. He warned looters and pledged his protection to the life and property of all people. This was designed to put confidence into the panic-stricken non-Bengali population who apprehended that the movement had taken a communal turn.
The Sheikh gave the regime till March 7 to come to terms. Till then he called a continuous hartal and enjoined the people to go in for a peaceful non-cooperation movement including non-payment of taxes.
The crowd which left the meeting was subdued and this was reflected in the tempo the next day where the military was more contained and less shooting took place.
That was significant because that very morning A. Mannan, MNA, Tangail, chief whip of the ALPP and publicity secretary of the party, had been beaten by security forces and had his shoulder shattered.
Ashrafuddin Chowdhury of the party, who was with him, was forced at gun point to clear a barricade at Outer Circular Road.
More such confrontations were imminent but were obviously subdued after the meeting. This did not still prevent firing that night but on a reduced scale from the previous night.
Published in Dhaka Tribune on Thursday, 12 March 2015.
March 1971 Diary (Part 4)
Rehman Sobhan
This extract is the fourth in a series that will run until March 25, in which we reproduce Rehman Sobhan’s contemporaneous account of the events of that momentous month in Bangladeshi history. This was first published in Forum on March 6, 1971
At 1:05pm on March 1a statement was issued in the name of President Yahya, which, contrary to all precedent, was read by an announcer on Radio Pakistan. Half an hour after hearing of the postponement of the assembly sine die, crowds, aroused to spontaneous outrage, were converging from all parts of Dacca towards Hotel Purbani, where the AL MNA’s were in session.
Many had armed themselves with bamboos, iron rods, and even hockey sticks. They were joined by the crowd at Dacca stadium who were watching the fag end of a boring cricket match. The moment the news came through, the play was suspended, shops were closed, and people, depending on their class and disposition, had either fled homewards or had armed themselves and headed for the Purbani.
At 2:30pm Mujib, flanked by his grim-faced high command, held a hurried press conference in which he declared that the postponement would not go unchallenged. He called a two day hartal on the 2nd for Dacca, and on the 3rd for the whole of Bangla Desh.
From Purbani the crowd converged on Paltan, where it was addressed by Tofail Ahmed and Mannan of Jatiyo Sramik League. The mood was militant and the crowd demanded action.
On March 2 they got it.
The hartal was of course total. Not even a bicycle could move in any corner of Dacca. On all the main roads barricades had been set up to obstruct movement of security forces. This provoked the first clash.
At Tejgaon, at the entrance of the Second Capital, the most formidable barricades had been set up by Tuesday morning. These were guarded by a highly militant populace. The police from Tejgaon thana were asked to remove the barricades but after taking a look at the menacing crowd went back to the thana, from where they refused to budge in spite of the exhortations of their officers.
After a while a detail of security forces appeared from the airport side. When they attempted to remove the barricades the crowd shouted slogans at them and they took up action stations. At that stage another security force came up in a jeep from the Second Capital.
On being confronted by the crowd, the force suddenly opened fire. Estimates indicate two dead and five injured, but there is no way of confirming the accuracy of this figure. Since then this has been a trouble spot and there was firing again that night when curfew had been imposed at 8pm.
In other areas of the city reports of clashes went on. In Jinnah Avenue goonda elements attempted to cash in on the situation and indulge in some free loot from putatively non-Bengali shops. The Awami League city chief rushed to the spot with volunteers and caught some looters with goods from Razzak, a local shirt shop. They were made to return the goods and soundly beaten.
In Nawabpur similar cases of looting occurred by local goondas and there were some communal clashes which seem to have been confined again to the local goondas.
Tension and militancy mounted throughout the day. The barricades, slogans and sounds of gunfire gave the city the air of a battlefield. In other parts of East Pakistan cities and towns had spontaneously come to a standstill. A strike by PIA employees had effectively cut East Pakistan off from the rest of the world.
The curfew imposed from 8pm therefore promised more clashes. By 9pm there were reports of crowds in the streets in many areas of Dacca. The chatter of gunfire could be heard throughout the night in many areas of the city. Next day’s toll indicated that in Medical College alone there were 35 dead and 113 injured, other casualties went to Mitford Hospital, or were placed in Iqbal Hall at Dacca University.
Published in Dhaka Tribune on Wednesday, 11 March 2015.
March 1971 Diary (Part 3)
Rehman Sobhan
This extract is the third in a series that will run until March 25, in which we reproduce Rehman Sobhan’s contemporaneous account of the events of that momentous month in Bangladeshi history. This was first published in Forum on March 6, 1971
Ever since Mr. Bhutto’s decision to boycott the assembly, confrontation has been in the air. The movement of anti-aircraft guns into strategic positions outside the airport a week ago had already generated consternation amidst the public that something was afoot.
There was a report that ex-Governor Ahsan cancelled his visit to Pindi at the last minute, but this was put at rest when he left the next day to attend the governor’s conference in Pindi. As a backdrop to this, Mr. Bhutto and President Yahya had held emergency discussions in Pindi. To crown it all came the abrupt dismissal of the cabinet.
Following the meeting of Martial Law administrators and governors, Lt. Gen Yakub, Governor Ahsan and Lt. Gen. Peerzada flew to Karachi, first for talks with Mr. Bhutto and then onward, for talks with Sheikh Mujib.
Whilst these three emissaries were in Karachi, news of Sheikh Mujib’s press conference giving his reactions to Mr. Bhutto’s political posture and underlining the dangerous implications of any further postponement of the National Assembly beyond March 3 came over the wires.
The statement broke a long and deliberate policy of restraint by the Sheikh on Bhutto’s histrionics and appears to have been inspired by concern that Bhutto’s intransigence may well have pressured the president into postponement.
Following this statement, President Yahya’s emissaries appeared to have detoured back to Pindi for more consultations with Yahya. Ahsan and Yakub then flew into Dacca. Peerzada was also expected and some newsmen even went to the airport to meet him — but he did not come at all.
In Dacca, it appears that Governor Ahsan indicated to Mujib, in his last and fateful meeting, the prospect of a possible postponement. Mujib warned him in no uncertain terms of the dangerous consequences of such a move.
In the meantime, the Awami League MNAs were in closed door session since February 27 to discuss the party’s constitutional draft. President Yahya had also flown to Karachi en route to Dacca.
West wing MNAs from Baluchistan, NWFP, Punjab and even the tribal areas were all on their way to Dacca for the National Assembly session, which on all counts, was scheduled for March 3.
On February 28, the emergency electrical generator was moved into place next to the president’s house indicating the imminent arrival of the president.
Incoming passengers from Karachi reported that President Yahya was booked to fly on the afternoon plane to Dacca. All security precautions had been made at Karachi Airport, passengers reported two hours in advance as customary when they have such august company.
But the president did not catch his flight and the plane flew without him into the conflagration which was spreading like wildfire throughout Bangla Desh.