Seemran Rashid
Undergraduate student, Economics, North South University
Email: seemran.rashid@northsouth.eduand
Muntasir Murshed
Graduate student, Economics, North South University
Email: muntasir.murshed@northsouth.edu
With the upcoming national parliamentary elections due to be unfolded towards the fag end of this year, the factors moulding the voting decisions of the voters in the country has become a major issue of both interest and stern apprehension. With the rest of the world busy in welcoming the New Year, Bangladesh is on course to choose its eleventh parliamentary body via electoral votes. Thus, it is a prime time to reflect on the voting behavior of the eligible voters. A million dollar question in this context is whether, or not, the decisions of the voters conform to the plethora of existing theories encapsulating voting behaviors.
Historically, a glut of diverse economic and political theories has tried to define the axiology of voting. For instance, in light of the altruism principle of voting, a voter’s decision to vote depends on his or her perception regarding his or her solitary vote determining the outcome of the election keeping the concept of social welfare into consideration. However, in the context of Bangladesh, the altruistic behavior of the voters seems to be a misfit in analysing their voting decisions as the concerned voters do not unanimously respond in unison with the altruism voting behavior. A core reason behind this assertion could be understood from the progressive rise in the magnitude of voters refraining from casting their votes. Reports from surveys on the young voters, in particular, seem to reflect a state of indifference in them whereby these voters are equally better-off in casting their votes and in refraining from being a part of the voting decision too. Moreover, it has also been empirically established that a good portion of voters in Bangladesh has an inflexible concept regarding their respective vote having a momentous worth in determining the voting consensus. According to them, their contribution will not make any significant difference; thus justifying their decision of absenteeism from the voting centres on the day of the election.
A more appropriate illustration of the mode of voting behavior in Bangladesh could be interpreted in terms of the economic theory adhering to the rational behavior of consumers. One particular segment of this theory states that a rational consumer must stick to his or her preference ordering over time. In the same vein, a rational voter’s preference should not be backward bending in the sense that the voter’s preference for candidate A over candidate B at present should not be reversed after a certain period of time, whereby the same voter just cannot claim to be preferring candidate B over candidate A in the future. This has exactly been the case in the voting trends of voters in Bangladesh which is pretty evident from the fact that certain political parties, once disowned by the voters and forced to concede power to another political party, successfully redeem their popularity over the course of one or two political regimes. Although one may argue that this redemption could well be justified by the proliferation of the possibilities of rectification of the mistakes in the upcoming political tenure, and therefore, there is no harm in providing a second chance to that political party to serve the nation. However, this argument seems to fail following the cyclical trends exhibited in the voting consensus of the general elections. This certainly is not a display of rationality in the decision-making mechanism of the voters.
Thus, the cyclical irrationality in voting behavior often hampers the development prospects of the economy as a whole since a change in the political regime, be it justified or not, invariably stalls the rate of development. More importantly, it generates a sense of disincentive in the political stakeholders in power to earnestly work for the betterment of the country following the apprehension, in the back of the mind, that no matter how well they perform their designated tasks the voting consensus in the next general elections are more than likely to go against their favor. As a result, the achievements of the elected parliamentary body, upon approaching towards the next national polls, often get unnoticed and rather the failures seem to be over-glorified. In such a scenario, the fall in the popularity of the political party in power is more due to the irrational and short-lived voting behavior of the voters than it is due to the actual failures that could have been outweighed, to some extent, for the greater interest of social well-being. In the context of Bangladesh, this illustration is no different.
That being said, with the given pool of election candidates to choose from, whomever the nation opts to hand over the political power for the next parliamentary regime, the elected members of the parliament should ideally keep the greater interest of the country in forefront and leave no stones unturned in collectively contribute to the betterment of the Bangladesh economy as a whole. This is because at the end of the day it is their own country that is at stake following the course of the actions of the elected individuals on whom the nation would be placing its trust to move forward.