Originally posted in The Business Standard on 25 March 2026
Of the 44 LDCs, 37 are WTO members, four are in the process of acceding. These countries account for less than 1% of the global trade.
Never in the history of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have the least developed countries (LDCs) approached a Ministerial Conference with such a dim outlook.
The 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14), set to open in Yaoundé, Cameroon, tomorrow (26 March), takes place against a backdrop of deepening unilateralism, institutional paralysis, and an increasingly hostile global trade environment.
Of the 44 LDCs, 37 are WTO members, four are in the process of acceding. These countries account for less than 1% of the global trade.
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For these countries, which depend most on the rules-based multilateral trading system, MC14 is not routine business. It is an existential moment.
The disruption of the global trade order
The most disruptive force reshaping global trade today is the unilateral trade policy of the United States.
Since early 2025, Washington has imposed sweeping tariffs invoking reciprocity, national security, and industrial competitiveness.
The US Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA-based tariffs in February 2026, ruling that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorise the President to impose tariffs. But the reprieve was brief.
The administration shifted to Section 122 of the Trade Act, announcing a 15% global tariff for 150 days.
Within weeks, the administration launched Section 301 investigations into 16 economies for structural excess manufacturing capacity — two of which, Bangladesh and Cambodia, are LDCs — and a separate probe into 60 economies over failure to enforce forced labour import bans.
What does this mean for LDCs? The weighted average US tariff on their exports has tripled to over 28%. Yet LDC exports account for less than 1% of total US imports.
In goods trade, the balance is currently positive for LDCs and growing — reaching $26 billion in 2025, driven largely by apparel exports from Cambodia and Bangladesh — while the US runs a surplus in services.
Washington’s fixation on the goods deficit, without accounting for services, amounts to a one-eyed approach to trade policy: disproportionate force applied to the most marginal participants in global commerce, with little regard for the asymmetry of the relationship.
The gradual withering of the WTO
The crisis is not limited to US unilateralism. The WTO itself is being hollowed out. Its negotiating function has stalled, with no major multilateral agreement concluded since the Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2013.
The dispute settlement mechanism — the crown jewel of the system — remains paralysed after years of blocked Appellate Body appointments, leaving members without recourse against rule-breaking.
The US has suspended its financial contributions, accumulating significant arrears.
Its December 2025 communication to the WTO General Council explicitly challenged the most-favoured-nation principle, arguing that countries must be able to treat different trading partners differently, and that the WTO’s future lies in plurilateral, not multilateral, negotiations.
The three reform tracks heading into MC14, covering governance, fairness, and so-called issues of our time, have generated more process than progress.
Notably, the EU, China, India, and the UK have all centred their MC14 statements on WTO reform — a rare convergence that underscores the depth of the institutional crisis even as these members differ sharply on what reform should look like.
The level playing field debate conspicuously excludes unilateral tariffs from the fairness discussion. And critically, food insecurity, gender, climate, digital trade, and policy space for industrialisation remain absent from the multilateral trade agenda.
The WTO is being weakened not only by external assault but by the failure to make it relevant to the challenges that actually define our time.
A relatively weak collective position of LDCs
LDCs enter MC14 from a position of structural weakness. Their share of global exports has stagnated at just over 1% since 2011. Thirty-eight of the 44 LDCs remain commodity-dependent.
Their productive capacities, as measured by UNCTAD’s index, score 23.6 out of 100, compared to 32.4 for other developing countries and roughly 70 for developed economies.
The Doha Programme of Action’s ambitious targets, including doubling LDC export share and enabling 15 additional graduations by 2031, are severely off track.
Only two countries have graduated since the DPoA was adopted in 2022.
The LDC Group at the WTO, coordinated by The Gambia, faces an unenviable task.
Twenty-six of the 30 holdover LDCs are in Africa, and for them the lapse of AGOA and the simultaneous expansion of Chinese duty-free access to all 53 African countries with diplomatic relations create a geopolitical tug-of-war over market alignment.
On the e-commerce moratorium, LDCs risk losing tariff revenue and digital policy space if it is made permanent at MC14, yet they lack the collective weight to block it.
Building coalitions within this group, and with the broader developing country membership, has not been easy — 44 countries spanning three continents, with vastly different trade profiles and immediate priorities, do not naturally speak with one voice.
The new scramble for LDC economies
The pressures on LDC economies are not coming from one direction alone.
The African Growth and Opportunity Act lapsed in September 2025 and was extended only through December 2026, the shortest renewal in its 25-year history, with the US demanding alignment with its America First Trade Policy.
China, meanwhile, has expanded duty-free quota-free access to all 53 African countries with which it has diplomatic relations, while actively investing in critical minerals across the continent.
The EU-India Free Trade Agreement, recently concluded, includes duty-free textile access for India, directly eroding preference margins that LDC exporters depend on.
The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism entered its definitive phase in January 2026, adding compliance costs that LDC exporters are poorly equipped to bear.
Meanwhile, the US is linking resource access in LDCs to peace deals and sanctions policy, brokering mineral extraction agreements through Rwanda in the DRC and lifting sanctions on Myanmar’s military-linked companies to access rare earth deposits.
The climate-trade interface remains an unresolved policy challenge, with green conditionalities multiplying but no commensurate support for LDC adaptation.
What this means for Bangladesh
Bangladesh approaches MC14 with what might be called a trinity of identities: it is an LDC until November 2026, a graduating LDC that has formally requested a three-year deferment from the UN Committee for Development Policy, and a future developing country that will need to navigate the post-preference landscape.
Each identity carries different types of challenges.
The US-Bangladesh Economic Partnership Agreement, signed in February 2026, offers a window into what bilateral trade relationships look like when the multilateral framework recedes.
In exchange for a reduction in tariffs to 19%, Bangladesh committed to purchasing Boeing aircraft, $15 billion in energy imports over 15 years, opening its agricultural market to US products, and buying US military equipment, with restrictions on imports from so-called non-market countries.
This is not trade diplomacy as LDCs have known it. It is a transactional arrangement that narrows policy space and constrains foreign relations.
For Bangladesh, and for graduating LDCs more broadly, the asks at MC14 must be defined through the LDC lens: binding extensions of duty-free quota-free market access beyond graduation, preservation of TRIPS flexibilities for pharmaceutical production, continued access to subsidies without being subject to dispute proceedings, concrete commitments on smooth transition support, and protection of the special and differential treatment provisions that graduating countries will shortly lose.
What MC14 must deliver
Expectations for MC14 are muted, and perhaps rightly so. But low expectations should not become an excuse for inaction.
For LDCs, a ministerial conference that produces no meaningful outcome is not a neutral result — it is a step backward. Six priorities should guide LDC delegations at Yaoundé and beyond.
First, defend consensus-based decision-making, the single undertaking, and the MFN principle. Push for restoration of the dispute settlement mechanism.
Second, secure binding extensions of international support measures for graduating LDCs, including DFQF, TRIPS waivers, and SDT flexibilities. The MC13 three-year transition period is insufficient.
Third, challenge the reframing of development tools such as export subsidies as trade violations, and demand that unilateral tariffs be included in the level playing field debate.
Fourth, insist that food insecurity, gender, climate, digital trade, and policy space for industrialisation be placed on the multilateral trade agenda.
Fifth, strengthen South-South coalitions through the G-33, the African Group, and regional platforms such as AfCFTA.
Sixth, prepare for life beyond preferences by accelerating smooth transition strategies, pursuing bilateral and regional trade agreements, and investing in productive capacities, export diversification, and services trade.
The multilateral trading system was built, in principle, to protect the interests of its weakest members. Whether it can still do so is the question MC14 must answer.
LDC ambassadors heading to Yaoundé must be clear-eyed about the environment they are walking into, and equally clear about what they intend to secure.
Dr Debapriya Bhattacharya is a former ambassador at the WTO and a Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD). Ms Mamtajul Jannat is a Senior Research Associate at CPD.
